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SUMMARY
There is a strong commitment to equality between 
women and men in international human rights law. The 
various actors within the treaty system who are tasked 
with elaborating on the meaning of human rights in 
international law have given close attention to gen-
der equality. This paper evaluates these elaborations 
against a conception of equality that is substantive. 
The achievement of substantive equality is understood 
here as having four dimensions: redressing disadvan-
tage; countering stigma, prejudice, humiliation and 
violence; transforming social and institutional struc-
tures; and facilitating political participa¬tion and social 
inclusion. The paper shows that, although not articu-
lated in this way, these dimensions are clearly visible in 
the application by the various interpretive bodies of the 
principles of equality to the enjoyment of treaty rights. 
At the same time, it shows that there are im¬portant 
ways in which these bodies could go further, both in 
articulating the goals of substantive equal¬ity and in 
applying them when assessing compliance by States 
with international obligations of equality. 
The first part of the paper gives a brief introduction 
to the background principles of substantive equal-
ity and explains the four-dimensional framework. The 
second part draws out the understandings of equality 
articulated by the interpretive actors within the UN 
human rights treaty system within this framework. It 
also points out some of the shortfalls in the cur¬rent 
approach to equality. The third part demonstrates how 
the four-dimensional approach to equality can be used 
to evaluate the impact of social and economic policies 
on women to determine how to make the economy 
‘work for women’ and advance gender equality. It does 
so by applying the four-dimensional approach to two 
contested issues in relation to social security: condi-
tionalities and austerity cutbacks. In both of these 
instances state action, whether in the form of cuts to 
social security or attaching conditions to social assis-
tance, must be evaluated in terms of the obligations 
of States that are party to the various human rights 
treaties. Part of a human rights evaluation involves a 
consideration of whether measures taken by States 
contribute to or detract from the right to equality. The 
substantive equality approach, in its four-dimensional 
form, provides an evaluative tool with which to assess 
policy in relation to the right to gender equality.
The paper suggests that there is a growing consensus 
at the international level on an understanding of sub-
stantive equality that reflects the four dimen¬sions set 
out here. Making this understanding explicit will assist 
in addressing, through a range of means, the chal-
lenges of gen¬dered inequality.
RÉSUMÉ
Le droit international des droits de l’homme témoigne 
d’un attachement viscéral à l’égalité de genre.   Au sein 
du système des traités, les différents acteurs chargés 
de préciser le sens des droits de l’homme au regard du 
droit international attachent une grande attention à 
l’égalité de genre. Le présent document examine ces 
questions en se fondant sur une conception de l’égalité 
réelle. La réalisation d’une égalité réelle est comprise 
ici comme un processus quadridimensionnel visant 
à : remédier au préjudice subi par les femmes ; lutter 
contre la stigmatisation, les préjugés, l’humiliation et 
la violence ; transformer les structures sociales et in-
stitutionnelles ; et faciliter la participation politique¬ 
et sociale. Le présent document montre que, même 
si elles ne s’organisent pas de cette manière, ces di-
mensions apparaissent clairement dans l’application 
des principes d’égalité des droits consacrés dans 
les traités par les différents organes chargés de leur 
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interprétation. Ce document montre également que 
ces organes peuvent aller plus loin, tant en établis-
sant les objectifs relatifs à une égalité réelle qu’en les 
appliquant au moment de l’examen du respect des 
obligations internationales d’égalité par les Etats. 
La première partie de ce document donne un bref 
aperçu des principes fondateurs d’une égalité réelle 
et  présente le cadre  quadridimensionnel. La deux-
ième partie présente les conceptions de l’égalité 
telles que comprises par les acteurs chargés de 
l’interprétation des droits au sein du système des 
instruments relatifs aux droits de l’homme dans ce 
cadre. Elle met également en exergue certaines lacu-
nes dans l’approche égalitaire actuelle. La troisième 
partie montre comment il est possible d’utiliser 
l’approche quadridimensionnelle fondée sur l’égalité 
pour évaluer l’impact des politiques sociales et 
économiques sur les femmes afin de s’assurer que 
l’économie répond aux besoins des femmes et de 
faire progresser l’égalité de genre. Elle applique, pour 
ce faire, l’approche quadridimensionnelle à deux 
questions contestées touchant à la sécurité sociale 
: les conditions et les mesures d’austérité. Dans ces 
deux cas, l’action publique, qu’il s’agisse de réduire 
les dépenses de la sécurité sociale ou de fixer des 
conditions à l’octroi de l’assistance sociale, doit être 
évaluée en termes d’obligations des États parties 
aux  différents traités relatifs aux droits de l’homme. 
Une évaluation de la situation concernant les droits 
de l’homme implique notamment d’examiner si les 
mesures prises par les Etats contribuent au droit à 
l’égalité ou y portent atteinte. L’approche fondée 
sur une égalité réelle, sous sa forme quadridimen-
sionnelle, fournit un outil d’évaluation qui permet 
d’évaluer les politiques à travers le prisme du droit à 
l’égalité de genre. 
Le présent document tend à montrer qu’il se dégage à 
l’échelle internationale un consensus grandissant en 
faveur d’une égalité réelle qui reflète les quatre ¬di-
mensions présentées ici. Expliciter cette conception 
permettra de relever les défis liés aux inégalités de 
genre par divers moyens.
 
RESUMEN
En el derecho internacional sobre derechos humanos 
existe un compromiso firme con la igualdad entre 
mujeres y hombres. Los diversos agentes que, dentro 
del sistema de tratados, tienen la misión de profun-
dizar en el significado de los derechos humanos en el 
derecho internacional han prestado una gran atención 
a la igualdad de género. En este artículo se evalúan 
estos análisis frente a una concepción sustantiva de la 
igualdad. Se considera que el logro de la igualdad sus-
tantiva implica la existencia de cuatro dimensiones: 
corregir las desventajas; contrarrestar los prejuicios, 
el estigma, la humillación y la violencia; transformar 
las estructuras sociales e institucionales; y facilitar la 
participación política y la integración social. El artículo 
pone de manifiesto que, si bien no están articuladas 
de esa manera, estas dimensiones son claramente 
visibles en la aplicación de los diversos organismos 
responsables de interpretar los principios de igualdad 
para el disfrute de los derechos consagrados en los 
tratados. Al mismo tiempo, demuestra que existen 
vías importantes que dichos organismos podrían 
explorar para llegar más lejos, tanto articulando los 
objetivos de la igualdad sustantiva como aplicándolos 
a la hora de evaluar el cumplimiento de las obligacio-
nes internacionales en materia de igualdad por parte 
de los Estados. 
En la primera parte del artículo se ofrece una breve in-
troducción a los principios que subyacen a la igualdad 
sustantiva y se explica el marco de cuatro dimensio-
nes. La segunda parte presenta las interpretaciones de 
la igualdad articuladas por los agentes interpretativos 
en el seno del sistema de tratados de derechos huma-
nos de las Naciones Unidas en este marco. Asimismo, 
Gender Equality 
and Human Rights iii
señala algunas de las deficiencias del actual enfoque 
sobre la igualdad. La tercera parte demuestra que el 
enfoque de cuatro dimensiones de la igualdad puede 
utilizarse para analizar la incidencia de las políticas 
sociales y económicas sobre las mujeres, con el fin de 
determinar la forma de conseguir que la economía 
“funcione en favor de las mujeres” y promueva la 
igualdad de género. Esto se consigue aplicando el 
enfoque de cuatro dimensiones a dos cuestiones 
objeto de debate en relación con la seguridad social: 
las condicionalidades y las medidas de austeridad. En 
ambos casos, la actuación del Estado, tanto en forma 
de recortes de la seguridad social o de imposición de 
condiciones para obtener asistencia social, debe ser 
analizada con arreglo a las obligaciones de los Estados 
partes en los diversos tratados de derechos humanos. 
Una parte de la evaluación de los derechos humanos 
consiste en examinar si las medidas adoptadas por los 
Estados contribuyen a realizar el derecho a la igualdad 
o bien limitan este derecho. El enfoque de la igualdad 
sustantiva, en su formato tetradimensional, consti-
tuye una herramienta de análisis que permite evaluar 
las políticas en relación con el derecho a la igualdad 
de género.
El artículo sugiere la existencia de un consenso creci-
ente a escala internacional sobre una interpretación 
de la igualdad sustantiva que refleja las cuatro 
dimensiones que aquí se establecen. Explicitar esta 
interpretación ayudará a hacer frente, por medios 
diversos, a los desafíos en materia de desigualdad de 
género.
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INTRODUCTION
The principle of equality is a central commitment in international human rights instruments. 
However, the right to equality is generally defined in open-textured terms. The central 
covenants simply refer to an obligation on States to ensure human rights without ‘distinction’, 
‘discrimination’, ‘exclusion’, or ‘restriction’ or ‘on the basis of equality’ as between men and 
women. The open-textured nature of this principle has been elaborated through the concluding 
observations, general recommendations, general comments and case law of the treaty bodies, 
as well as through the reports of experts operating under the special procedures of the Human 
Rights Council.1
This paper aims to draw out the evolving understand-
ings of equality in order to articulate a clear standard 
by which to evaluate social and economic policies and 
thereby to ‘make the economy work for women’ (the 
purpose of the broader Progress of the World’s Women 
report). We show that in the context of women, these 
understandings are best conceived as an elaboration 
of the principle of substantive equality. Traditionally, 
equality has been understood in formal terms, requiring 
simply that likes be treated alike. In the United States, 
this traditional understanding is known as the ‘anti-
classification’ principle, which requires individuals to 
be treated on their own merit, regardless of their race, 
or other equivalent characteristics. Formal equality has 
been of central importance for women, particularly in 
achieving equality before the law, whether in terms of 
equal suffrage, equal right to own property or other 
similar rights. In many countries, formal equality is yet 
to be achieved. However, even when women are equal 
before the law, they lag considerably behind in many 
respects, particularly in social and economic terms. 
This has highlighted the weaknesses in a concept of 
equality that focuses only on treating likes alike. Equal 
treatment, in the context of considerable antecedent 
disadvantage, might simply entrench that disadvan-
tage. Moreover, equal treatment is agnostic as to the 
level of treatment: the principle is fulfilled whether all 
are treated equally well or equally badly. Ultimately, it 
is not so much the fact of the difference in treatment 
on the grounds of sex that should be at issue, but that 
a woman is subjected to disadvantage on the grounds 
of her sex. 
1 A brief explanation of the UN human rights treaty mecha-
nisms will be provided in Part 2 below.
This has prompted the development of more substan-
tive notions of equality. While all agree on the need to 
move beyond formal equality, there remain several al-
ternative conceptions of substantive equality, such as 
equality of results, of opportunity or of dignity. While 
each of these has its strengths, they remain incomplete. 
Instead, we draw on a synthesis or four-dimensional 
understanding of substantive equality.2 The first di-
mension focuses on redressing disadvantage rather 
than insisting on like treatment. This moves away from 
a symmetrical approach and opens the way to differ-
ent treatment if appropriate to address disadvantage. 
It also precludes a ‘levelling down’ option, whereby 
equality is achieved by removing benefits rather than 
extending them. Thus the first dimension of substan-
tive equality in the context of women is to redress 
the disadvantage associated with gender. The second 
dimension is based on an underlying concept of dig-
nity, aiming to address stigma, prejudice, humiliation 
and violence. The third dimension recognizes that 
barriers to equality are deeply rooted in institutional 
and social structures. Rather than aiming at a gender-
neutral future, which expects women to conform to 
a male-defined world, equality for women must be 
transformative, entailing a redistribution of power and 
resources and a change in the institutional structures 
that perpetuate women’s subordination (see Fredman 
2003: 115). Most importantly, the transformative di-
mension recognizes that change must be structural 
and not dependent solely on correcting the actions of 
individual perpetrators. Finally, the fourth dimension 
recognizes that those without voice cannot rely on the 
2 This formulation was first developed in Fredman 2002 and 
further developed in Fredman 2011, Chapter 1. 
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political process to redress their wrongs. It there-
fore requires equal participation both socially and 
politically. 
In brief, the four dimensions of substantive equality 
are thus: to redress disadvantage; to counter stigma, 
prejudice, humiliation and violence; to transform 
social and institutional structures; and to facilitate 
participation, both in the form of political participa-
tion and social inclusion.3 
Below we elaborate the four-dimensional framework 
and evaluate the ways in which the various inter-
pretive bodies understand and apply the principles 
of equality in international law according to these 
dimensions. We show that, although not articulated 
in this way, the dimensions are clearly visible in the 
3 These terms are similar to Nancy Fraser’s articulation of a 
theory of justice (participatory parity) based on recognition, 
redistribution and participation. See Fraser and Honneth 
2003. The four-dimensional framework was developed 
independently (see note 2 above) to capture the meaning 
of substantive equality, but Fraser’s concepts, particularly 
that of recognition, have been very helpful in the further 
articulation of the framework. 
application by the various interpretive bodies of the 
principles of equality to the enjoyment of treaty 
rights. At the same time, we show that there are im-
portant ways in which these bodies could go further, 
both in articulating the goals of substantive equal-
ity and in applying them in assessing compliance by 
States with international obligations of equality. 
The first part of this paper gives a brief introduction 
to the background principles of substantive equality 
and explains the four-dimensional framework. The 
second part draws out the understandings of equality 
articulated by the interpretive actors within the UN 
human rights treaty system within this framework. 
It also points out some of the shortfalls in the cur-
rent approach to equality. The third part of the paper 
demonstrates how the four-dimensional approach 
to equality can be used to evaluate the impact of 
social and economic policies on women to determine 
how to make the economy ‘work for women’ and 
advance gender equality. It does so by applying the 
four-dimensional approach to two contested issues 
in relation to social security. 
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1.	
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY: 
A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK
The principle of equality in international human rights instruments is expressed in very 
general and open-textured terms. Thus, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) provides that every human being is entitled to all the rights and freedoms 
within the Declaration ‘without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ 
(UN General Assembly 1948). Similarly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) requires States to respect and ensure the rights in the Covenant ‘without distinction’ 
(UN General Assembly 1966a, article 2), while the International Covenant on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) requires State parties to guarantee that the rights enunciated in 
the Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind on the grounds mentioned 
in the UDHR (UN General Assembly 1966b, article 2(2)). Both the ICCPR (article 3) and ICESCR 
(article 3) have specific provisions for the ‘equal right’ of women and men to the enjoyment 
of all rights in the respective Covenants. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) focuses specifically on women, stating that ‘discrimi-
nation against women’ shall mean ‘any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis 
of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, 
civil or any other field’ (UN General Assembly 1979, article 1). 
The generalized, open-textured reference to equality 
and non-discrimination has made it possible for the 
interpretation of equality to evolve as the problems 
faced by women are better understood and as new 
challenges arise. The first step in the development of 
a legal principle of equality requires the dismantling 
of formal legal impediments. These include the exclu-
sion of women from the right to vote or hold public 
office, to enter into the paid labour market, to hold 
property or to have custody over their own children 
(Fredman 1997). In many countries, legal equality 
was only achieved in the first part of the twentieth 
century; but in a disturbing number of countries, such 
equality has still not been achieved. This is reflected 
in the number of reservations entered to CEDAW, 
many of which are entered by States that cite Sharia 
law as regulating matters of personal status such as 
marriage, divorce, custody and inheritance (Freeman 
2009). As many as 30 States have entered reservations 
to article 16 of CEDAW (equality in marriage) either in 
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part or in full (UN Women 2011). As Freeman puts it, 
such reservations ‘relegate laws and practices that 
critically affect women’s human rights to a system 
that is unreachable by and unaccountable to interna-
tional norms’ (2009: 6). 
Legally mandated and institutionalized inequal-
ity between women and men has a serious effect on 
women’s ability to access economic resources and 
empowerment. In some countries, exemptions from 
the constitutional equality guarantee are provided 
for personal or customary law, with the result that it 
remains legal to discriminate against women in rela-
tion to marriage, divorce, marital property ownership 
and succession. Examples of practices that might fall 
within this exception and that directly impact wom-
en’s economic opportunities and affluence include 
early marriage, property grabbing by the husband’s 
family on his decease, and polygamy. In rural areas, 
customs and traditional practices frequently prevent 
women from inheriting or acquiring ownership of 
land and other property and from accessing financial 
credit and capital. The fact that women are subjected 
to de jure discrimination in relation to marriage, suc-
cession, divorce, custody of children, social security 
and other rights also has significant consequences for 
their ability to access paid work. Women who are sub-
ject to early marriage, to treatment as minors under 
the guardianship of male relatives, to eviction from 
their property on widowhood and to other legal forms 
of discrimination are inevitably highly limited in their 
ability to undertake paid work or to benefit from paid 
work in terms of income, training, career progression 
or solidarity at work. Without secure rights to educa-
tion, property, social security or contract, labour market 
participation is severely compromised: where women 
can access jobs at all, they are likely to be precarious 
or on poor terms and conditions (for more details, see 
Freeman 2013a: 8–10). This is often exacerbated by the 
absence of reproductive rights, prohibitions on abor-
tion and express legal prohibitions, such as ‘protective 
legislation’ barring women from certain types of work 
or night work.  
Although equality before the law is a major achieve-
ment, it is far from sufficient. In many countries, 
women are still subjected to discriminatory cus-
tomary and religious norms that directly impact 
inheritance, property ownership, rights on divorce and 
widowhood and access to resources. Even where such 
patterns do not exist, women are still unequal in the 
labour market and the home. Particularly pervasive 
is gender-based violence, which continues to occur 
at alarming rates across the globe and frequently 
remains without legal sanction.  
This reflects the need for a legal approach that goes 
beyond equality before the law and takes the form 
of legal prohibitions on discrimination or unequal 
treatment, whether by public or private actors. The 
starting principle has generally been that of equal 
treatment or a prohibition of direct discrimination. 
Direct discrimination is based on the underlying prin-
ciple that likes should be treated alike. It prohibits less 
favourable treatment on the grounds of sex or other 
‘protected’ characteristic. In the United States, this 
has taken the form of the ‘anti-classification’ principle. 
The equal treatment or anti-classification principle 
remains of central importance in addressing blatant 
prejudice, that is, where women are treated less fa-
vourably than men simply because they are women. 
However, this principle cannot address more institu-
tional or deep-seated forms of inequality. There are 
several reasons for this.4 
First, the principle of equal treatment only applies if 
there is a similarly situated man who has been more 
favourably treated on grounds of sex than the woman. 
The reliance on a male comparator is a highly con-
formist principle. In the powerful words of Catherine 
MacKinnon: ‘Concealed is the substantive way in which 
man has become the measure of all things. Under the 
sameness standard, women are measured according to 
our correspondence with man. . . . Gender neutrality is 
thus simply the male standard’ (MacKinnon 1987: 34). 
For example, women will only be entitled to equal pay 
or equal treatment to men if they can do the same jobs 
4  This section draws on Fredman 2011, p. 9ff.
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and work the same hours as their male counterparts. 
Women with childcare responsibilities will be excluded 
from equal treatment unless they are able to find other 
women to look after their children, and the latter are 
invariably low paid. The principle that likes should be 
treated alike is particularly ill-suited to deal with preg-
nancy as there is no suitable comparator for pregnant 
women. It is also unsuited to deal with the wage gap 
in situations of job segregation. Where women are 
clustered in low-paying occupations, there may be no 
male comparator doing like work for higher pay. Thus 
the principle of equal treatment requires women to 
conform to male-oriented social structures. It does 
nothing to challenge the structures themselves.
Second, the principle that likes should be treated 
alike is a symmetric principle. It assumes that any 
different treatment on the ground of sex is wrong in 
itself, regardless of whether its aim is to perpetuate or 
redress pre-existing disadvantage. Yet unequal treat-
ment might be necessary to achieve equal results, 
particularly where women have been subjected to 
disadvantage in other spheres. 
Third, as long as men and women are treated alike, 
there is no difference in principle between treating 
them equally badly and treating them equally well. 
Moreover, because the equal treatment principle 
is agnostic as to the substantive outcome, it can be 
fulfilled by removing benefits from men rather than 
extending benefits to women (Fredman 2011:356– 
 
357). The result is that women might be worse off and 
men no better off.  
Fourth, the equal treatment principle assumes that 
the cause of the violation can be traced to the behav-
iour (or fault) of individual perpetrators. Yet structural 
inequality requires change even if no individual or 
state body can be proved to be ‘at fault’.
It was to address these limitations of the principle that 
likes should be treated alike that substantive equality 
was developed. To do so, substantive equality should 
have at least four features. First, it should be asym-
metric. That is, it should distinguish between different 
treatment that causes further detriment to a disad-
vantaged group and different treatment that aims to 
redress past disadvantage and therefore improve the 
position of a disadvantaged group. Second, it should 
move away from the assumption of conformity to a 
male norm. Instead, it should accommodate differ-
ence and change existing structures. Third, it should 
insist on levelling up rather than down. And fourth, it 
should entail a positive responsibility to bring about 
change, regardless of whether individual culpability 
or violation has been established. Several different 
concepts have been used to address these challenges, 
such as equality of results, equality of opportunity and 
equality of dignity. All of these have their advantages 
and limitations. Drawing on their strengths leads to 
a four-dimensional approach to equality, which is 
sketched below (Fredman 2002; 2011: 25–33). 
1.1	
Redressing disadvantage 
The first dimension of substantive equality con-
centrates on remedying disadvantage rather than 
achieving gender neutrality. Disadvantage is both 
material and social. Gender-based disadvantage 
includes the lack of empowerment of women 
within the context of family and social relations. 
Substantive equality aims to redress disadvantage in 
its specifically gendered context, including women’s 
subordinate position in the family and reproduction, 
in the paid workforce and in other relationships of 
power. The focus on redressing disadvantage has 
two important implications. First, it is incompatible 
with a ‘levelling down’ solution, as only if the posi-
tion of those who are worse off is raised to that of 
the better off can equality in this sense be satisfied. 
Second, it contemplates different treatment in order 
to redress disadvantage. This means that affirmative 
action measures in favour of women do not breach 
the principle of equality as long as their aim is to 
redress discriminatory disadvantage. 
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1.2	
Stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence
The second dimension of substantive equality in-
cludes stigma, stereotyping, humiliation and violence 
on grounds of gender. This dimension is best under-
stood in terms of what Nancy Fraser calls ‘recognition’ 
wrongs. The concept of ‘recognition’ is based on the 
Hegelian notion that our identity is constructed 
(at least partially) in terms of the ways in which 
others regard us. ‘Recognition’ wrongs consist in 
‘misrecognition’ or inequality in the mutual respect 
and concern that people feel for one another in soci-
ety (Fraser 2003: 29).
Such wrongs can be experienced regardless of 
relative socio-economic disadvantage and distributive 
wrongs. 
1.3	
Accommodation and transformation
The third dimension of substantive equality entails 
a recognition of the ways in which the structures of 
society entrench women’s disadvantage. Instead of re-
quiring women to conform to male norms, it requires 
transformation of existing male-oriented institutions 
and social structures. With this comes the imperative 
to transcend the public-private divide, recognizing 
the ways in which imbalances in power in the family 
can reinforce power imbalances in the public sphere 
and vice versa. This in turn entails the requirement of 
positive duties to achieve equality as well as negative 
duties to prevent discrimination. Substantive equal-
ity also requires the accommodation of differences 
between women. 
1.4	
Agency and voice
The final dimension of substantive equality is the 
importance it attaches to women’s agency and voice. 
As has been recognized in several jurisdictions, equal-
ity should specifically compensate for the absence 
of political power of groups ‘to whose needs and 
wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in 
attending’ (Ely 1980: 46). Substantive equality requires 
decision makers to hear and respond to the voices of 
women rather than imposing top-down decisions. 
The challenges of giving women voice cannot be 
underestimated. Articulating women’s interests from 
a gendered perspective requires closer attention to 
the diversity of women’s voices, to the possible dis-
juncture between those who speak and those who 
are affected and to the need to ensure that the least 
vocal are nevertheless heard. Moreover, as much as 
women’s voices should be heard in engendering social 
and economic rights, so social and economic rights are 
necessary to give women the capability of articulat-
ing their perspectives. Substantive equality also has 
the important effect of imposing positive duties on 
the state to treat women differently, provide oppor-
tunities for participation and restructure institutions 
appropriately. 
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1.5		
Interaction between the dimensions
One of the key advantages of a multi-dimensional ap-
proach is that it provides a framework within which 
to address the interaction between dimensions. The 
idea of the four-dimensional structure is to draw 
explicit attention to all four dimensions in evaluating 
positions or programmes. Rather than viewing one as 
a trump over the others, the dimensions should medi-
ate each other, leading to a synthesis or more nuanced 
response. For example, measures aimed at redistribu-
tion can themselves cause recognition harms, such 
as the stigma experienced by welfare beneficiaries. 
Affirmative action measures are similarly said to be as-
sociated with increased stigma. The four-dimensional 
approach makes it possible to address these tensions. 
Given that equality aims to redress disadvantage as 
well as to address stigma, it is crucial to design both 
welfare and affirmative action measures in ways that 
advance dignity as well as redistribution. On the other 
hand, simply addressing recognition harms without 
paying serious attention to structural change, such 
as improving the quality of educational provision, is 
unlikely to achieve substantive equality. Moreover, 
affirmative action measures may not be sustained 
unless there is underlying structural or transforma-
tive change. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
increase in women Members of Parliament following 
on the Labour Party’s policy of ‘women-only shortlists’ 
was soon reversed because there was no change in 
parliamentary hours, which make it very difficult to be 
a participative parent. Similarly, the multi-dimensional 
approach precludes the argument that measures in-
creasing disadvantage do not breach equality because 
they have no impact on the dignity of the claimant.5 
The participatory dimension also needs to be consid-
ered together with other dimensions. While voice is 
important, it is not necessarily an end in itself if those 
women who speak have the effect of worsening other 
women’s disadvantage or perpetuating stigma, preju-
dice or violence. As an extreme example, the fact that 
some women perpetuate harmful practices such as 
female genital mutilation or breast ironing does not 
in itself justify the devastating effects on women. 
1.6	
Substantive equality: legal concepts 
Concepts and terminology within the framework of 
substantive equality have evolved in the enactment 
and interpretation of equality at the international and 
domestic level. Particularly important was the devel-
opment of the concept of disparate impact, developed 
by the US Supreme Court to address the limitations 
of sole reliance on the principle of equal treatment. 
In the landmark case of Griggs v Duke Power,6 the 
employer had applied a uniform aptitude test to both 
white and African American job candidates. But be-
cause African-American applicants had long received 
inferior education in segregated schools, the test op-
erated to disqualify such applicants at a substantially 
higher rate than whites. The court held that, under 
5 Gosselin v Quebec 2002 [SCC] 84 (Supreme Court of Canada). 
See now R v Kapp 2008 SCC 41 (Supreme Court of Canada).
6 Griggs v Duke Power Co. 401 US 424, 91 S Ct 849 (1971) (US 
Supreme Court).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, equal treatment could 
be discriminatory if it led to unequal results unless 
justified by business necessity. In the United Kingdom 
and the European Union (EU), this principle is known 
as indirect discrimination. Indirect discrimination 
makes it unlawful to apply an apparently neutral 
criterion, provision or practice that puts persons of 
one sex at a particular disadvantage compared with 
persons of a different sex, unless it is a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.7 At the same 
7 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle 
of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation, article 2(1)
(b). See also: Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, article 2(2)(b); 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establish-
ing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation Article 2(2)(b); UK Equality Act 2010 s19.
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time, the concept of indirect discrimination or dispa-
rate impact is under sustained attack in the country of 
its origin – the United States. Soon after Griggs, the US 
Supreme Court held that the concept did not apply to 
constitutional review. Only in cases of purposeful dis-
crimination could a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause in the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution 
be established.8 More recently, some justices in the US 
Supreme Court have doubted whether the concept of 
disparate impact is ever compatible with the constitu-
tional equality guarantee.9  
Addressing indirect discrimination is an important 
step towards substantive equality in that it focuses 
on equality of impact rather than equality of treat-
ment. For example, if workers’ pensions depend on 
contributions through a continuous working life, then 
women who have had to take time out for childcare 
will be subject to a particular disadvantage. However, 
indirect discrimination is an incomplete version of 
substantive equality. A major reason for this is that 
inequality of results may be justified for business 
reasons or even on the grounds of state public policy. 
For example, if it can be shown that a qualification is 
necessary for the proper fulfilment of the job, there 
is no indirect discrimination. On its own, the principle 
of indirect discrimination does not require steps to 
be taken to improve the skills or qualifications of the 
disadvantaged group. In this sense, it does not redress 
disadvantage, nor require institutional change, and 
therefore does not satisfy at least two of the dimen-
sions of substantive equality. 
A further and related legal concept aiming to advance 
substantive equality is that of reasonable accom-
modation or adjustment. This principle requires an 
express adaptation of the existing environment 
in order to make it possible for a disadvantaged 
individual to participate. It works best in relation 
to disability, where it imposes a duty on employers, 
service providers or other public bodies to find a way 
of reasonably accommodating the needs of a person 
with a disability so that she can participate fully in 
a job or service. However, accommodation is usually 
addressed to the individual rather than the overall 
structure. In addition, it is limited to ‘reasonable’ 
adjustment, or adjustment without causing the pro-
vider undue hardship. 
1.7		
Multiple locations and identities
The fact that women have multiple locations and 
identities impacts on their experience of discrimina-
tion and the need for an approach to equality that 
can recognize and deal with these complexities. Thus, 
in a particular country, laws relating to dress codes 
might operate harshly against Muslim women but 
not against women of other cultures or Muslim men. 
The same is true for countries with Muslim personal 
laws, which impact on Muslim women but not on 
other women or Muslim men. Similarly, laws that 
prevent girls from inheriting might impact on African 
women subject to customary law but not on African 
men or on women of other racial or ethnic groups in 
that society. A less direct example might occur where 
8 Washington v Davis 426 US 229, 96 S Ct 2040 (1976) (US 
Supreme Court).
9 Ricci v. DeStefano 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009) (US Supreme Court)B.
a company, trying to meet affirmative action targets 
on race and gender, hires white women and black 
men.Black women will lose out because the policy or 
law does not take account of what has been described 
as ‘intersectional discrimination’ (Crenshaw 1989: 139; 
Iyer 1993; Grabham et al. 2009) – the combination of 
status-based inequalities that create additional forms 
of discrimination. Multiple forms of discrimination 
might also compound the experience of discrimina-
tion. Thus, all women might fear for their safety in a 
society where gender-based violence is common and 
policing is poor. However, poor women who cannot af-
ford public transport and must walk home from work 
in the dark would face greater dangers than their 
better-off counterparts. Substantive equality requires 
detailed attention to the context in which discrimina-
tion occurs so as to unpack the often complex and 
hidden forms of gender inequality. 
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1.8		
The individual and the group
A multi-dimensional approach also allows us to ad-
dress one of the key challenges facing the move from 
formal to substantive equality, namely the relationship 
of the individual to the group or collective. Formal 
equality, and its associated legal principle of direct 
discrimination, tends to focus on the individual, the 
assumption being that prejudice and stereotyping 
are generalizations that obscure individual merit. This 
in turn ignores the group-based nature of inequality 
and the need to address systems and institutions that 
perpetuate such inequality. On the other hand, a focus 
on groups might disguise intra-group inequalities and 
submerge individual agency and autonomy. In this 
context, it is important to be transparent about the 
interaction between the different dimensions. This 
requires us to ask whether affirming cultural diversity 
in practice aggravates women’s disadvantage because 
of harmful intragroup practices in relation to women, 
or whether the real distinctions between women 
should be respected in order to enhance their choice 
and agency. Particularly important is the question of 
who speaks for the group and whether minority voices 
within the group can be heard. The multi-dimensional 
approach requires us to weigh cultural justifications 
against evidence of gendered stigma and disadvantage 
and the possibilities of meaningful consent and choice. 
1.9		
The evolution of substantive equality in international human 
rights law
As was seen above, human rights instruments in inter-
national law follow similar patterns in their approach 
to the rights to equality and non-discrimination. The 
concept of equality tends to be stated in general 
terms, without further elaboration. The UDHR begins 
by affirming that ‘all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights’ (Article 1). Both the ICCPR 
(article 3) and ICESCR (article 3) have specific provi-
sions for the ‘equal right’ of women and men to the 
enjoyment of all rights in the respective Covenants. 
Several covenants have more specific provisions. Both 
the UDHR and ICCPR provide that men and women 
are entitled to equal rights in marriage and its disso-
lution.10 The ICESCR provides for ‘equal pay for work of 
equal value without distinction of any kind, in particu-
lar women being guaranteed conditions of work not 
inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for 
equal work’ (article 7(a)(i)). 
10 UDHR, Article 16 states that men and women are entitled 
to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and its 
dissolution. As in the Universal Declaration, there is also 
specific provision in article 23(4) of the ICCPR for equality of 
rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution. 
The principle of non-discrimination has more explicitly 
evolved towards a substantive understanding. This 
can be seen in both CEDAW and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD),  which go beyond the other conventions in 
that they include distinctions, inclusions or restric-
tions that have either the purpose or the effect of 
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of 
human rights. This recognizes that equal treatment 
might lead to unequal results, and therefore that it 
is not just the purpose but also the effect that mat-
ters. In its 1989 General Comment, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) took the view that the more expan-
sive definition in CEDAW and CERD should apply to 
the term ‘discrimination’ as used in the ICCPR (HRC 
1989, para 7). 
A second important step in the evolution towards 
substantive equality is the inclusion of positive duties 
on States to respect, protect and fulfil the rights to 
equality and non-discrimination. The traditional view 
of equality and non-discrimination focuses on an in-
dividual interaction, requiring proof that a perpetrator 
has violated that non-discrimination norm resulting 
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in damage to an individual victim. However, the focus 
on proof of breach by a named perpetrator means 
structural and institutional inequalities that cannot 
be traced to an individual perpetrator are outside 
the scope of enforcement. The seeds of such a posi-
tive duty are found in article 26 of the ICCPR, which 
provides that: ‘All persons are equal before the law and 
are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall pro-
hibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination 
on any ground such as [the protected grounds].’ In its 
1989 General Comment, the HRC has affirmed that 
this guarantees not only equality before the law and 
equal protection of the law, but also places a posi-
tive duty on the State to prohibit discrimination and 
guarantee equal and effective protection (HRC 1989, 
para 1). Note also that whereas article 2 applies only 
to the rights contained in the Covenant, article 26 pro-
hibits discrimination in any field regulated by public 
authorities (ibid., para 12).
However, the real push towards an integrated un-
derstanding of substantive equality focussed on the 
re-interpretation of the meaning of ‘temporary special 
measures’ in CEDAW. Article 4(1) of CEDAW provides 
that ‘adoption by States Parties of temporary special 
measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality 
between men and women shall not be considered 
discrimination as defined in the present Convention’. 
Special measures or affirmative action are controver-
sial in that they appear to breach the equal treatment 
principle by requiring preferential treatment on the 
grounds of gender. However, once it is recognised 
that advantageous treatment might be necessary to 
counter previous disadvantage, it becomes clear that 
‘special measures’ are not a derogation from equality, 
but a means to achieve it. The wording of article 4 of 
CEDAW demonstrates this tension. It appears to ac-
cept that gender-based provisions constitute a prima 
facie breach of the equal treatment principles, while 
at the same time recognizing that measures specifi-
cally benefitting women might be necessary. Hence 
the need to call these measures ‘special’ and to insist 
that they are ‘temporary.’11
11  This section is taken from Fredman 2003.
In a very productive expert meeting in Maastricht in 
2002, these tensions were explored as part of the pro-
cess of formulating a new general recommendation 
on the issue of temporary special measures.12 It was 
stressed that article 4(1) makes it clear that ‘accelerat-
ing de facto equality’ of men and women is one of the 
goals of the Convention and therefore contributes to 
the understanding that substantive equality is preva-
lent in the Convention (Holtmaat 2003: 215). Particular 
importance was placed in the meeting on the need 
to develop an understanding of substantive equal-
ity that made it clear that the adoption of measures 
benefitting women was not an exception to equality 
but a means of achieving it. For example, although 
CEDAW speaks with several different voices, it was 
argued that the conception of equality embodied in 
the convention should be regarded as a transforma-
tive one (Fredman 2003: 115).
In its landmark General Recommendation No. 25 on 
temporary special measures, the CEDAW Committee 
stressed that the Convention was a dynamic 
instrument, which went ‘beyond the concept of dis-
crimination used in many national and international 
legal standards and norms’ (2004, para. 5). Most im-
portantly: ‘In the Committee’s view, a purely formal 
legal or programmatic approach is not sufficient to 
achieve women’s de facto equality with men, which 
the Committee interprets as substantive equality. In 
addition, the Convention requires that women be giv-
en an equal start and that they be empowered by an 
enabling environment to achieve equality of results. 
It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that 
is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well 
as socially and culturally constructed differences be-
tween women and men must be taken into account. 
Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment 
of women and men will be required in order to address 
such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive 
equality also calls for an effective strategy aimed at 
overcoming underrepresentation of women and a 
redistribution of resources and power between men 
and women.’ Moreover, ‘The position of women will 
not be improved as long as the underlying causes of 
discrimination against women, and of their inequal-
ity, are not effectively addressed. The lives of women 
12  Ibid.
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and men must be considered in a contextual way, and 
measures adopted towards a real transformation of 
opportunities, institutions and systems so that they 
are no longer grounded in historically determined 
male paradigms of power and life patterns’ (ibid., 
para. 10).  Several of the key aspects of the multi-
dimensional understanding of substantive equality 
are clearly evident here. 
The lead taken by the CEDAW Committee was soon fol-
lowed in relation to the ICESCR. In General Comment 
No. 16 in 2005, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) elaborated on the meaning of 
article 3 of the Covenant, which provides for the equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. In this Comment, the 
Committee made it clear that ‘The essence of article 3 
of ICESCR is that the rights set forth in the Covenant 
are to be enjoyed by men and women on a basis of 
equality, a concept that carries substantive meaning. 
…Guarantees of non-discrimination and equality in 
international human rights treaties mandate both de 
facto and de jure equality. De jure (or formal) equality 
and de facto (or substantive) equality are different but 
interconnected concepts. Formal equality assumes 
that equality is achieved if a law or policy treats men 
and women in a neutral manner. Substantive equality 
is concerned, in addition, with the effects of laws, poli-
cies and practices and with ensuring that they do not 
maintain, but rather alleviate, the inherent disadvan-
tage that particular groups experience’ (CESCR 2005, 
paras. 6–7). It should be noted that the reference to 
alleviating rather than maintaining disadvantage 
registers the commitment within substantive equal-
ity to a ‘levelling up’ approach. This also differentiates 
the equality right from basic minimum rights. As 
the Special Rapporteur on water has put it: ‘While 
universality is about ensuring access for all, equality 
is about “levelling up” or working towards improving 
the quality and levels of service of groups that lag be-
hind’ (UN General Assembly 2012a, para. 29). As will be 
seen below, however, the commitment to levelling up 
is under-developed in the practice of the committees. 
While the CESCR’s General Comment 16 was con-
cerned with the equal rights of women and men, 
the later General Comment 20 in 2009 elaborated 
on more general principle of non-discrimination 
on a wide range of grounds, including race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status 
(CESCR 2009). Building on the framework in General 
Comment 16, it specifically differentiates formal and 
substantive discrimination, where the latter requires 
‘paying sufficient attention to groups of individuals 
which suffer historical or persistent prejudice instead 
of merely comparing the formal treatment of indi-
viduals in similar situations’ (ibid. para. 8). The General 
Comment is also more explicit than previous docu-
ments in distinguishing expressly between direct and 
indirect discrimination, and in its use of the concept 
of systemic discrimination, or discrimination against 
some groups that is ‘pervasive and persistent and 
deeply entrenched in social behaviour and organiza-
tion’ (ibid., paras. 10 and 12).
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2.	
EQUALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
THE FOUR-DIMENSIONAL 
APPROACH
The second part of this paper considers the extent to which a multi-dimensional notion of 
substantive equality is already reflected in current interpretations of international treaty 
obligations, and the extent to which there is room for continuing development of these 
interpretations in order to make further progress towards an international commitment to 
substantive equality. It will be seen that, while there is little attempt to articulate and apply a 
consistent framework to evaluate progress towards substantive equality, there is neverthe-
less a strong, implicit adherence to the aims encapsulated in the concept. It is suggested 
here that by making these connections explicit and fully articulating the growing consensus 
at the international level on an understanding of substantive equality that reflects the four 
dimensions set out above, the extent to which policies can be shaped to address the specific 
challenges of gendered inequality can be considerably enhanced.  
The UN treaty body system is comprised of interna-
tional treaties on various aspects of human rights. The 
treaties set up committees to monitor compliance 
based on country reports. Their comments and recom-
mendations are called concluding observations. They 
also provide interpretations of aspects of the treaties 
in general comments or recommendations. In some 
cases, where optional protocols exist for a particular 
treaty, the committee makes a decision in response to 
individual complaints about the compliance of a State 
party with its treaty obligations.13 In addition to the 
treaty system, the Human Rights Council has special 
procedures that provide mandates to individuals or 
groups who are independent human rights experts 
on a particular topic. They report and advise on their 
areas of expertise.
13 There is also provision in some treaties for inter-state com-
plaints and inquiries. These are not examined in this report.
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The most recently reported concluding observations 
(during 2012 and 2013) were used in relation to these 
treaties. The large number of reports completed during 
the lifespan of these committees makes it difficult to 
survey every report for this study. For reasons of method-
ological practicality as well as contemporary relevance, 
the most recent reports were therefore chosen for 
examination. It should be noted that the concluding 
observations of the five treaty committees during the 
past two years do not necessarily reflect their entire his-
torical approach to the particular issues discussed here 
but rather their most recent views. However, all general 
comments and recommendations prepared by each 
of the committees were considered in this study. Thus, 
the analysis of these, which are fully representative of 
 
the committees’ work, carry greater methodological 
weight than the analysis of the concluding observa-
tions given the longer period of time over which they 
were produced.
Table 1-2 shows the regional breakdown of the 
State reports for the last three sessions (July 2012–Feb-
ruary 2013) of the CEDAW Committee. Of these, the 
following countries were selected for examination: 
Angola, Austria, the Bahamas, Bulgaria, Chile, Macedonia, 
Pakistan and Togo (with occasional reference to other 
country reports). Because there were no country reports 
from the MENA region in this reporting period, we have 
also included the report from Jordan, which was from 
an earlier reporting period (February 2012). 
Region Number of reports States
Middle East North Africa (MENA) 0
Central and Eastern Europe and  
Central Asia 
5 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, The Former Yugo-
slav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, 
Developed Regions 3 Austria, Greece, New Zealand
East Asia and Pacific 3 Indonesia, Samoa, Solomon Islands
Caribbean and Latin America 5 Bahamas, Chile, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico
South Asian 1 Pakistan
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 Angola, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea
The following table identifies the treaties discussed in this paper and the acronyms used; the bodies for each 
treaty; and the types of output that the body produces. 
Treaty Treaty Body Work of Treaty Body 
International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)
Human Rights Committee (HRC) Concluding observations
General comments
Individual complaints 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
Committee on Economic Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
Concluding observations
General comments
Individual complaints (as of 5 May 2013)
Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD)
Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD)
Concluding observations
General recommendations
Individual complaints 
Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)
Committee on the Elimination of 
Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW Committee)
Concluding observations
General recommendations
Individual complaints 
Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities (CPRD)
Committee on Rights of People 
with Disabilities (CPRD)
Concluding observations
General recommendations
Individual complaints 
TABLE	1-1	
Overview of treaties
TABLE	1-2	
Regional breakdown of State reports for last three sessions of the CEDAW Committee 
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The reports of the following special procedures bodies 
and individuals were also examined: 
•  the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and 
human rights (formerly the Independent Expert) 
(Special Rapporteur on poverty); 
• the Special Rapporteur on the right to food; 
• the Special Rapporteur on the right to housing; 
•  the Special Rapporteur on the human right 
to safe drinking water and sanitation (Special 
Rapporteur on water); 
•  the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health (Special 
Rapporteur on health); 
• the Special Rapporteur on the right to education; 
•  the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign 
debt and other related international financial 
obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all 
human rights, particularly economic, social and cul-
tural rights (Independent Expert on foreign debt); 
•  the Working Group on the issue of discrimination 
against women in law and in practice.
2.1	
Redressing disadvantage
As previously discussed, the first dimension of sub-
stantive equality requires a focus not simply on 
treating people in the same way, regardless of their 
gender, but on redressing women’s specific disad-
vantage. This entails a recognition of the interlocking 
nature of women’s disadvantage: how imbalances of 
power within the home and family radiate outwards 
into inequalities in the labour force and more gener-
ally in access to resources and public life. 
This section examines the extent to which treaty 
bodies and special procedures mandates pay specific 
attention to the ways in which gendered relationships 
within the family impact on women’s access to 
resources, including property rights, paid work and 
socio-economic rights such as health, housing and 
social welfare. It is not enough to point to the many 
situations in which women remain subject to formal 
legal disabilities; it is also important for UN bodies to 
highlight substantive disadvantage, whether or not 
caused by legal inequalities. As the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food has shown, discrimination against 
women may be the result of unequal laws but is more 
generally caused by a cycle of interrelated forms of 
discrimination that include: ‘social norms or customs, 
linked to certain stereotypes about gender roles; 
unequal access to productive resources such as land 
and to economic opportunities, such as decent wage 
employment; unequal bargaining position within the 
household; gendered division of labour within house-
holds, that result both in time poverty for women and 
in lower levels of education; and women’s margin-
alization from decision-making spheres at all levels’ 
(HRC 2012a, para. 3). He adds that lack of recognition 
of reproductive rights is also part of this cycle since 
women lose out on work and education by having to 
marry and have children early (ibid., para. 4).
This section explores the extent to which the UN 
bodies have recognised and reflected the interlock-
ing nature of women’s disadvantage. It begins by 
considering the ways in which the UN bodies have 
linked inequality in marriage to women’s wider ma-
terial disadvantage. It then moves on to examine the 
UN bodies’ approach to other key forms of women’s 
disadvantage: in housing, at work (both paid and 
unpaid), in health and education, and in relation to 
poverty and access to social security.  
(a) Marriage, succession and property 
As well as insisting on formal equality in relation to 
marriage and property, the treaty bodies have made 
some attempts to draw contracting States’ attention to 
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the ways in which substantive equality can be breached 
by inequality in marriage and property (ICCPR 2012, 
paras. 38 and 95). Thus in its interpretation of the 
equality principle in article 23 of the ICCPR (the right 
to equality in marriage), the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) has addressed the role of marriage laws and 
customs in facilitating and perpetuating other forms 
of disadvantage against women.14 For example, the 
absence of divorce laws in the Philippines is identified 
as potentially compelling victims of sexual and gender-
based violence to remain in violent relationships.15 
Behind this is the recognition that disadvantage is 
not just material, but is also about power. The CEDAW 
Committee, in interpreting the equivalent provision 
in the Convention it monitors,16 has taken this further, 
focusing on both the legal rights and the practice 
that contribute to women’s disempowerment and 
disadvantage through the institution of marriage.17 The 
Committee is particularly concerned at the persistence 
of polygamy and early marriage.18 All the committees 
stress the importance of prohibiting child marriage,19 
14 ICCPR, article 23 requires States Parties ‘to take appropriate 
steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of 
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution’. 
According to the ICCPR Reporting Guidelines for contracting 
States, States should report specifically on discrimination in 
the minimum age of marriage; unequal rights in marriage; 
equality in divorce arrangements, including custody of 
children; rules concerning acquisition or loss of nationality by 
reason of marriage; and polygamy and forced marriage (ICCPR. 
2010. “Reporting Guidelines”, op. cit., paras 38 and 95.)
15 HRC. 2012. “Concluding Observations the Philippines Fourth 
Periodic Report.” CCPR/C/PHL/CO/4, para 12.
16  CEDAW, article 16, requires States to ensure the same rights 
for men and women to enter into marriage and freely choose 
a spouse, as well as the same rights during marriage and on 
its dissolution, including in respect of property ownership
17 For example, CEDAW Committee. 2012. “Concluding 
Observations Chile Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic 
Report.” CEDAW/C/CHL/CO/5-6, para 46–47.
18 CEDAW Committee. 2013. “Concluding Observations Angola 
Sixth Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/AGO/CO/6, para 35; CEDAW 
Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Togo Combined 
Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/TGO/CO/6-7, 
para 40–41; CEDAW Committee. “Concluding Observations 
Pakistan Fourth Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/PAK/CO/4, para 
2 and para 33-4; CEDAW Committee. 2012. “Concluding 
Observations Jordan Fifth Periodic Report.” CEDAW/ C/JOR/
CO/5, para 49–50.
19 HRC. 2013. “Concluding Observations Angola First Periodic 
Report.” CCPR/C/AGO/CO/1, para 11; HRC, the Philippines, op. 
cit., para 11; CESCR. 2012. “Concluding Observations Mauritania 
First Periodic Report.” E/C.12/MRT/CO/1, 18; CEDAW Committee, 
Angola, op. cit., para 35–6.
which perpetuates women’s disadvantage in many 
ways, including obstructing their education, exposing 
them to violence and risking their reproductive health, 
The redistributive dimension of substantive equal-
ity further focuses attention on the ways in which 
inequality within marriage leads to women’s dis-
advantage in access to resources. This is reflected in 
the concern expressed by treaty bodies at the ways 
in which discriminatory marriage and inheritance 
laws bar women’s access to land, and with it the 
possibilities of credit and other capital resources.20 
This is further linked with the recommendation that 
the State party ensure equality in the devolution of 
matrimonial property.21 As well as legal prohibitions, 
the CEDAW Committee points to customary laws 
discriminating against women with regard to inheri-
tance of land.22 It also points to the plight of widows 
in some State parties who are subject to property 
dispossession or ‘grabbing’, often contrary to custom-
ary obligations to maintain widows and their children 
(CEDAW Committee 2013, para. 50). From the other di-
rection, the absence of proper regulation of unmarried 
cohabiting couples may negatively affect the woman 
partner, particularly in relation to maintenance and 
the distribution of property on the cessation of the 
relationship.23 
It is notable too that the committees do not consider 
that religious codes are a good reason for discrimina-
tory family law. Thus in relation to the Philippines, 
the HRC recommends that the Government amend 
its Muslim personal laws to achieve equality for 
women.24 Similarly, in relation to Pakistan, the CEDAW 
Committee expresses concern that under Muslim law, 
women have unequal rights with respect to inheri-
tance, the dissolution of marriage and its economic 
20 CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 39.
21 HRC, the Philippines, op. cit., para 12.
22 CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 35; CEDAW Committee, 
Togo, op. cit., para 40-41; CEDAW Committee, para 2 and paras 
33–4; CEDAW Committee, Jordan, op. cit., para 49–50.
23  CEDAW Committee. 2913. “Concluding Observations Austria 
Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/
AUT/CO7-8, para 50; CEDAW Committee. 2012. “Concluding 
Observations Bahamas Combined First thru Fifth Periodic 
Report.” CEDAW/C/BHS/CO/1-5, para 37-8; CEDAW 
Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 40.
24  HRC, the Philippines, op. cit., para 11.
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consequences, and the guardianship of children, and 
asks the State party to enact legal provisions to en-
sure that, on dissolution of marriage, women have 
equal rights to property acquired during marriage.25 
(b) Housing
The importance of understanding the interlocking 
issues of power and resources in fleshing out the 
concept of substantive equality is highlighted by the 
Special Rapporteur on the right to housing, who em-
phasizes the ‘close connection that exists between the 
right to adequate housing and the right to equality’ 
since ‘adequate housing for women goes to the heart 
of social inequality and discrimination’ (HRC 2011). In 
her report she makes it clear that: ‘When a woman is 
unable to access adequate housing and land mainly 
because she is a woman, she is not only affected in 
terms of her immediate material needs, she is also 
relegated to a subordinate and dependent position 
within society because of her gender. Ensuring that 
women have access to and control over, vital resources 
such as housing and land is essential to challenging 
and changing gender power structures and patterns of 
gender inequality which continue to oppress, exclude 
and relegate women to the margins.’ 26
(c) Work: paid and unpaid
How to detect and address inequality in relation to 
work, both paid and unpaid, has been central to the 
quest for substantive equality for women. The treaties 
on the face of it take a fairly formal equality view of 
this issue. Thus article 11(1) of CEDAW requires States 
only to ensure the ‘same’ rights for women and men 
in relation to the rights to work, to employment op-
portunities, to free choice of profession, promotion, 
job security and training, to equal remuneration, to 
social security and to protection of health and safety 
at work, including safeguarding reproduction. Article 
3 of the ICCPR simply requires State parties to ‘ensure 
the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment 
of all civil and political rights set forth in the present 
Covenant’. However, it is now well established that 
the same treatment for men and women is unlikely to 
bring about change. This is because the world of paid 
25  CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., para 37.
26  Ibid.
work is modelled on a ‘male norm’, privileging those 
who are able to work full-time and continuously, and 
placing higher value on work that has been tradition-
ally done by men. Thus in order to address women’s 
inequality, it is necessary to focus on the specificity 
of women’s disadvantage, particularly by recognizing 
the link between discrimination in the home and dis-
crimination at work and the extent to which women’s 
primary responsibility for childcare and unpaid work in 
the home impacts on their ability to access good qual-
ity paid work. The extent to which this link is drawn is 
investigated below by considering the various bodies’ 
approaches to gender pay gaps, the informal sector, 
domestic workers, and unpaid work. 
Concluding observations show that the treaty bodies 
have moved away from an equal treatment model of 
equality in the way that they deal with inequalities 
at work and are generally sensitive to the ways in 
which women’s disadvantage at work is interlinked 
with their position in the home, thus reflecting the 
dimension of substantive equality that aims to re-
dress disadvantage. However, their recommendations 
are frequently limited to proposing that measures be 
taken to address this issue, without being more spe-
cific as to the kind of remedies needed. 
(i) Gender pay gap: The tenacity of a gender pay gap 
in all the countries in the current reporting round is 
striking. Recent concluding observations repeatedly 
require States to take concrete measures to close the 
wage gap between men and women.27 However, the 
nature of such measures is rarely specified. In ad-
dition, not enough attention is paid to the need to 
recognize that women’s disadvantage in the labour 
market needs to be addressed not just through la-
bour market measures but also by paying more at-
27 HRC. 2013. “Concluding Observations Belize First Periodic 
Report.” CCPR/C/BLZ/CO/1, para 12; HRC. 2012. “Concluding 
Observations Germany Sixth Periodic Report.” CCPR/C/DEU/
CO/6, para 8; HRC. 2012. “Concluding Observations Portugal 
Fourth Periodic Report.” CCPR/C/PRT/CO/4, para 4; HRC. 2013. 
“Concluding Observations Macao, China.” CCPR/C/CHN-
MAC/CO/1, para 9; CEDAW Committee. 2013. “Concluding 
Observations Macedonia Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic 
Report.” CEDAW/C/MKD/CO/4-5, para 31; CEDAW Committee. 
2012. “Concluding Observations Bulgaria Combined Fourth 
thru Seventh Periodic Report.” CCPR/C/BGR/CO/4-7, para 33–4; 
CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 33. 
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tention to women’s burden in the home. The ICESCR 
reporting guidelines require countries to report on 
measures taken to reconcile personal, professional 
and family life,28 but this issue is pursued less fre-
quently in concluding observations. One good ex-
ample of a substantive approach is in relation to Es-
tonia, where the Committee recognizes the difficulty 
women face in reintegrating into the labour market 
and urges the State party to ensure the availability 
and affordability of day-care services.29 Article 11(2) 
of CEDAW requires States to prohibit dismissal on 
grounds of pregnancy, as well as providing for paid 
maternity leave and ‘encouraging the provision of 
the necessary supporting social services to enable 
parents to combine family obligations with work re-
sponsibilities and participation in public life, in par-
ticular through promoting the establishment and 
development of a network of child-care facilities’. 
However, it does not require equal parental rights 
for fathers. 
(ii) Informal sector: Women’s disproportionate pres-
ence in the informal sector consistently across coun-
tries is a further symptom of the gendered distribu-
tion of labour in the home, which prevents women 
from competing on equal terms in the formal labour 
force. All the committees express concern at the spe-
cific disadvantage of informal workers, particularly in 
relation to lack of access to social security, employ-
ment protection or decent wages and conditions.30 
The ICESCR guidelines require State parties to pro-
vide information on the informal economy, and in 
particular on measures taken to ensure access of in-
formal workers, especially older workers and women, 
to basic services and social protection (ICESCR 2008, 
para. 16). Although in the concluding observations in 
this study CESCR does not explicitly draw the con-
nection with women’s disadvantage, it consistently 
notes with concern the size of the informal sector 
28 ICESCR. 2008. “Reporting Guidelines.” CESCR 41st Session. 
E/C.12/2008/2, para 20; CESCR. 2011. “Concluding Observations 
Argentina Third Periodic Report.” E/C.12/ARG/CO/3, para 14.
29 CESCR. 2011. “Concluding Observations Estonia Second 
Periodic Report.” E/C.12/EST/CO/2, para 14; see also CEDAW 
Committee, Macedonia, op. cit., para 31.
30 HRC, the Philippines, op. cit., para 9; CESCR, Argentina, op. cit., 
para 14. 
and the poor conditions of informal workers.31 For 
example, in relation to Argentina, the Committee ex-
pressed concern at the conditions of work and mini-
mum wages experienced in particular by outsourced 
workers, and women in domestic work, the textile 
industry and the agricultural sector.32 In the United 
Republic of Tanzania, the CESCR recommended that 
measures be taken to increase the access of women 
to employment in the formal sector, in particular 
those living in rural areas.33 
The CEDAW Committee expresses the most consis-
tent concern at the concentration of women in the 
informal sector with no legal protection and no ac-
cess to social security. For example, the Committee 
notes with concern that 56.6 per cent of the female 
working population in Mexico is engaged in the in-
formal labour sector and hence lacks access to social 
security benefits,34 while in Turkmenistan, 52.8 per 
cent of women work in the informal sector.35 Similarly, 
in relation to Pakistan, the Committee is concerned 
at the situation of women working in the informal 
sector (agriculture, domestic and home-based work), 
in particular the fact that they are not recognized in 
the existing labour legislation as workers and as such 
are unprotected and do not have access to social secu-
rity and benefits.36 This is true too for Angola, Guyana, 
Samoa and Togo.37 Also of concern to the Committee 
is the high proportion of women doing unpaid fam-
ily work. Its response is generally to recommend the 
provision of a regulatory framework for the informal 
31 CESCR. 2012. “Concluding Observations Cameroon Second and 
Third Combined Periodic Report.” E/C.12/CMR/CO/2-3, para 14 
and 18; CESCR. 2012. “Concluding Observations Ecuador Third 
Periodic Report.” E/C.12/ECU/CO/3, para 15; CESCR, Ethiopia, op. 
cit., para 10; CESCR, Mauritania, op. cit., para 14. CESCR. 2012. 
“Concluding Observations United Republic of Tanzania First, 
Second and Third Combined Periodic Report.” E/C.12/TZA/
CO/1-3, para 9.
32  CESCR. Argentina, op. cit., para 14. 
33  CESCR, United Republic of Tanzania, op. cit., para 9.
34  CEDAW Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Mexico 
Seventh and Eighth Combined Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/
MEX/CO/7-8, para 28 
35 CEDAW Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations 
Turkmenistan Third and Fourth Combined Periodic Report.” 
CEDAW/C/TKM/CO/3–4, para 32.
36 CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., para 29. 
37 CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 29; CEDAW 
Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 32–33; CEDAW Committee, 
Pakistan, op. cit., para 29–30.
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sector, with a view to providing women in this sector 
with access to social security and other benefits.38 In 
a more concrete measure, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) extended labour protections to 
homeworkers (who are predominantly women) in 
1996 through Convention No. 177.
The committees have also been sensitive to the ways 
in which these issues are exacerbated for women 
with intersectional identities. For example, the CESCR 
expressed concern at the disparity in social secu-
rity coverage in Ecuador: whereas 22 per cent of the 
total population is covered, this figure is only 12 per 
cent for indigenous women and 18 per cent for Afro-
Ecuadorian women.39 
(iii) Domestic workers: A similar pattern is evident 
in relation to domestic work. The CESCR pays 
particular attention to poor working conditions 
of domestic workers, again with the implicit 
acknowledgement of the specifically gendered 
nature of this disadvantage.40 For example, in Ecuador, 
the law sets a lower minimum wage for domestic 
workers,41 and in many countries domestic workers 
are simply excluded from minimum wage and other 
em-ployment protection, as in Kuwait42 and Qatar.43 
Kuwait is identified by the CERD Committee as of 
particular concern because of the type and extent 
of abuse suffered by domestic workers at the hands 
of their employers, police and immigration officers. 
Some have to remain in untenable abusive situations 
because they can only change employers after 
38 CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 30; CEDAW 
Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Guyana Seventh 
and Eighth Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/GUY/CO/7-8, para 
31(b); CEDAW Committee, Mexico, op. cit., para 29(d); CEDAW 
Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., para 30(b); CEDAW Committee, 
Samoa, op. cit., 31(b); CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., 33(b); 
CEDAW Committee, Turkmenistan, op. cit., para 33(b)
39  CESCR, Ecuador, op. cit., para 20.
40 CESCR, Argentina, op. cit., para 14; CESCR, Mauritania, op. cit., 
para 14.
41 CESCR, Ecuador, op. cit., para 15.
42 CERD Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Kuwait 
Fifteenth thru Twentieth Combined Periodic Report.” 
CERD/C/KWT/CO/15-20, para 16.
43 CERD Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Qatar 
Thirteenth thru Sixteenth Combined Periodic Report.” 
CERD/C/QAT/CO/13-16, para 13.
three years.44 Nor is legislation improving domestic 
workers’ conditions suf-ficient: implementation and 
enforcement are crucial.45 
The CEDAW Committee, in the concluding observa-
tions covered in this study, consistently expresses 
concern at the precarious situation and vulnerability 
of domestic workers. In the latest reporting round, 
this was particularly true for the Bahamas, Chile, 
Cyprus, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan and 
Togo. It is here that intersectional discrimination is 
particularly acute, with the vast majority of domes-
tic workers being either migrant women, such as in 
Chile and Cyprus, or members of racialized groups. 
In Indonesia, it points to the persistence of child la-
bour, in particular the situation of girl child domestic 
workers who work long hours, do not have access to 
education and may be subjected to violence, and the 
lack of effective and concrete measures to eliminate 
this phenomenon.46 The same is true for Togo, where 
the Committee is deeply concerned about the exploi-
tation of a large number of children, especially girls, 
in domestic work.47 In this respect, the Committee’s 
recommendations have been more specific. As well 
as placing particular emphasis on the extension of 
labour rights to domestic workers, it has helpfully 
stressed the importance of monitoring, inspection, 
enforcement and awareness-raising. 
An extraordinarily important breakthrough was 
achieved in June 2011 when the Domestic Workers’ 
Convention (C189) was overwhelmingly passed by 
members of the ILO. It came into force on 5 September 
2013, having been ratified by the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, Italy, Guyana, Mauritius, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa and Uruguay. 
In an important attempt to achieve consistency and 
co-ordination between international human rights 
44  Ibid., para 23.
45  CEDAW Committee, Chile, op. cit., paras 30–31.
46 CEDAW Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations 
Indonesia Sixth and Seventh Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/
IND/CO/6-7, para 37. 
47  CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 32.
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bodies, the CEDAW Committee regularly recom-
mends that States ratify the Convention.48
(iv) Role of unpaid work: It is not only paid work but 
also unpaid work that is highlighted by the distribu-
tive dimension of substantive equality. The CEDAW 
Committee has drawn attention to the problem of 
unpaid work of women in family enterprises in rural 
and urban settings (1991a). It has also noted the need 
to measure and value the unpaid domestic work that 
women provide all over the world (1991b). This is made 
particularly clear by the Special Rapporteur on water, 
who makes specific reference to the ‘distributional 
dimensions of inequality’ as part of the principles of 
non-discrimination, equality and equity within the 
framework for advancing these rights (UN General 
Assembly 2012a, paras. 11 and 13). Thus she notes that 
‘women and girls are overwhelmingly tasked with col-
lecting water and are physically and sexually threat-
ened when they fetch water’. True to the principles 
of substantive equality, she emphasizes that efforts 
to achieve goals on the provision of water and sani-
tation must target the most disadvantaged rather 
than focus on aggregate outcomes. Moreover, ‘while 
universality is about ensuring access for all, equality 
is about “levelling up” or working towards improving 
the quality and levels of service of groups that lag be-
hind’ (ibid., para. 14). A rights-sensitive analysis iden-
tifies patterns of inequality in service provision (ibid., 
para. 18). 
The crucial importance of recognizing the role of 
unpaid caring work in order to advance substantive 
equality for women has been most vividly highlighted 
in the 2013 report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty (UN General Assembly 2013). She 
shows how the ‘heavy and unequal responsibility for 
unpaid care is a barrier to women’s greater involve-
ment in the labour market’ (ibid., para. 8). Moreover, 
‘the amount, intensity and drudgery of unpaid care 
work increase with poverty and social exclusion’ (ibid., 
48  CEDAW Committee, Bahamas, op. cit., para 33(e); CEDAW 
Committee, Chile, op. cit., para 31(c); CEDAW Committee. 
2013. “Concluding Observations Cyprus Sixth and Seventh 
Combined Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/CYP/CO/6-7, para 28(c); 
CEDAW Committee, Indonesia, op. cit., para 38(a); CEDAW 
Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., 30(d) CEDAW Committee, Togo, 
op. cit., para 33(a).
para. 14). In particular, because of inadequate state 
provision of key infrastructure such as energy, water 
and sanitation, poor women and girls living in rural 
areas in developing countries spend large amounts of 
time collecting water and fuel. Indeed, studies show 
that women and girls in sub-Saharan African spend a 
shocking 40 billion hours a year collecting water, which 
the Rapporteur points out is equivalent to one year of 
work by the entire French workforce (ibid., para. 15). 
(d) Health and education
Health is a further arena where the specificity of 
women’s disadvantage needs to be recognized as 
part of a substantive equality approach (CEDAW 
Committee 1999). The treaty bodies in the conclud-
ing observations in this study consistently refer to 
high maternal mortality rates, lack of access to birth 
assistants, particularly in rural areas, the prevalence 
of vesico-vaginal fistulas and the disproportionately 
high levels of women infected with HIV and AIDS.49 
The Special Rapporteur on the right to health has 
noted the discrimination in access to medicines for 
vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, including 
women and girls (UN General Assembly 2006). All 
of these entail an implicit recognition of the power 
structures causing and perpetuating women’s disad-
vantage. Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty has highlighted the impact of the dispro-
portionate burden of unpaid work on the health of 
carers, who are predominantly women. As she points 
out: ‘There are limits to how much care a person can 
give without negative impacts on their own health. 
Thus, when public policies implicitly assume the free 
and limitless availability of unpaid care, and fail to 
take it into account by supporting, funding or pro-
visioning care, this can have a major impact on the 
health of women caregivers and the quality of care 
that they are able to provide’ (UN General Assembly 
2013, para. 43). 
Women are also particularly disadvantaged in 
relation to education. The Special Rapporteur on 
education has noted that girls and women make up 
the majority of those facing discrimination in this 
49  For example, CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., paras 34–35; 
CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, op, cit., paras 30–31.
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area (HRC 2011b, para. 13). A human rights framework 
is critical in challenging the ‘multiple forms of dis-
crimination which women and girls in vulnerable 
and marginalized situations suffer’. On the face of it, 
the human rights instruments tend to stress equal 
treatment in relation to education rather than tak-
ing a substantive approach. Thus CEDAW article 12 
requires State parties to give women the same op-
portunities in relation to education as men, including 
the same conditions for access to studies, access to 
the same curricula and examinations and the same 
opportunities to benefit from scholarships and to 
participate actively in sports. On the other hand, 
there are important provisions in CEDAW that take a 
substantive perspective, especially a requirement to 
reduce female student dropout rates and increase ac-
cess to family planning education. In applying these 
provisions, the CEDAW Committee is in a position to 
stress the more substantive aspects, in particular by 
highlighting women’s particular disadvantage. This 
can be seen, for example, in relation to Jordan, where 
the Committee raises concerns about the exclusion 
of young married women from schooling and the 
underrepresentation of women in post-secondary 
education in non-feminized areas such as technical-
vocational training.50 
The Special Rapporteurs have developed this further, 
pointing out that lack of education has a multiplier 
effect on other kinds of disadvantage. The Special 
Rapporteur on education has shown that gender 
inequities in education put girls at risk of HIV in-
fection and rape due to their subordinate position 
(Commission on Human Rights. 2006, para. 17). 
Conversely, equal education is crucial to achieve sub-
stantive equality. Thus, the Special Rapporteur on the 
right to food has said that equal education of women 
is a key determinant of food security. Similarly, the 
Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty has shown 
the extent to which unpaid caring work can impinge 
on the education of girls, whether because they 
simply have less time for studying or because they 
are actually taken out of school to undertake unpaid 
care work, particularly where mothers are disabled or 
deceased (UN General Assembly 2013, para. 40). 
50  CEDAW Committee, Jordan, op. cit., para 35.
(e) Poverty, access to resources and social 
security
Although poverty affects both men and women, it is 
compounded for women by gendered inequality (UN 
General Assembly 2012a, para. 20). This can be seen 
in relation to key rights such as access to water and 
sanitation, and the right to food. This is particularly 
well demonstrated by the Special Rapporteur on wa-
ter who explains: ‘When households share sanitation 
facilities, women and girls may be required by social 
norms concerning privacy to avoid using the facilities 
except during hours of darkness, when their personal 
safety may be at increased risk’ (ibid., para. 19). 
This is exacerbated in the current financial crisis. 
Various UN-appointed human rights experts have 
noted the links between the global financial crisis, 
austerity and growing poverty facing women that 
is impacting on women’s access to employment 
and services. For example, the independent expert 
on foreign debt has called on States to address the 
unequal gender impacts of austerity including ‘re-
ductions in public services, social security benefits, 
childcare facilities and public employment, and ... the 
increased level of unemployment among women’ 
(UN General Asssembly 2012b, para. 23). He has also 
linked principles of equality, non-discrimination and 
participation as an approach to commenting on 
‘the impact of foreign debt and related policy con-
ditionalities on the realization of women’s rights, in 
particular their economic, social and cultural rights’ 
(ibid., para. 5). International financial institutions in 
relation to loans and conditionalities often fail to 
consider and address the needs of women (ibid., para. 
20). Without this perspective, policies contribute to 
the ‘feminization of poverty and deepening gender 
inequality’ (ibid., para. 22). States should promote 
women’s involvement in development planning and 
decision-making related to debt management (ibid., 
para. 23). Moreover, ‘States should adopt temporary 
special measures to accelerate the equal enjoyment 
by women of all economic, social and cultural rights’ 
to address this situation’ (ibid.). 
This is endorsed by the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty, who emphasizes that ‘scarcity of resources 
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in times of economic hardship is not an acceptable 
justification for discriminatory measures or failing 
to implement anti-discrimination policies’ (HRC 2011, 
para. 21). She adds that ‘considering that gender in-
equality is a cause of and a factor that perpetuates 
poverty, effective recovery policies must take into ac-
count State obligations regarding gender equality and 
the protection of women’s full range of rights’ (ibid., 
para. 23). The ILO recently passed the Social Protection 
Floors Recommendation, which links the right to so-
cial security to the promotion of ‘equal opportunity 
and gender and racial equality’ (ILO 2012).
It is important in this context to bear in mind the 
interaction between the different dimensions of 
substantive equality. Redistributive measures are 
not in themselves sufficient to address gendered 
disadvantage. It is here that the transformative di-
mension should also come into play. Social security 
schemes that depend on contributions from continu-
ous, full-time participation in the paid workforce will 
not benefit women with interrupted careers due to 
childcare obligations or women in precarious work or 
the informal sector. This aspect is sporadically high-
lighted by the various bodies. In relation to Austria, 
the CEDAW Committee expresses concern at social 
security pension systems based on contributions 
that are penalizing women who have taken childcare 
career breaks and part-time employment.51 The HRC 
found violations of gender equality following a 
51 CEDAW Committee, Austria, op. cit., para 36.
complaint relating to social security in Zwaan-de Vries 
v. the Netherlands, where a married woman had more 
onerous conditions attached to her unemployment 
benefit claim than a married man.52 An even more 
holistic approach is taken by the Special Rapporteur 
on the right to food, who stresses the importance of 
social protection and asset transfer programmes that 
are gender sensitive. Improved worker rights, access to 
employment, childcare and access to land, extension 
services and finance are crucial to address discrimina-
tion against women in relation to their rights to food 
(HRC 2012a).
(f) Intersectional disadvantage
Disadvantage is clearly compounded in relation to 
intersectional identity, particularly among indigenous 
and migrant women53 and, in Europe, the Roma. The 
CERD Committee has noted that forms of racial dis-
crimination may be specifically directed at women 
because of their race and gender. Examples include 
abuse of informal and domestic workers (CERD 
Committee 2000). Similarly the Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty shows how the ‘discriminatory be-
liefs about marginalized ethnic minorities exacerbate 
their marginalization and are linked to the common 
overrepresentation of women of marginalized ethnic 
groups in low-paid unprotected work’ (UN General 
Assembly 2013, para. 18). 
52 HRC. 1984. “Communication No. 182/1984.” CCPR/C/OP/2 
(1990).
53  For example, CEDAW Committee, Chile, op. cit., para 33.
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2.2	
Addressing stigma, prejudice, stereotyping and violence
Redressing disadvantage does not fully capture all 
aspects of the inequality experienced by women. It is 
also crucial to take account of prejudice, denigration, 
stigma, stereotyping and violence on the ground of 
gender. This dimension is premised on the founda-
tional value of dignity. It also draws on the helpful 
concept of recognition, developed by Fraser and 
Honneth from Hegel’s notion that individual identi-
ties are constructed through mutual recognition. 
By using the concept of recognition to complement 
dignity, we acknowledge that the right to equality is 
more than an individual right but depends centrally 
on relationships between people within communities, 
and in particular on inequality in the mutual respect 
and concern that people feel for one another in soci-
ety (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). 
Dignity and recognition wrongs can be experienced 
regardless of relative socio-economic disadvantage but 
they can also compound it. Thus, for example, the stig-
ma attached to welfare recipients or the poor increases 
their disadvantage. Similarly, dignity and recognition 
wrongs can cause disadvantage.54 Undervaluing wom-
en’s work is a recognition wrong that directly causes 
socio-economic disadvantage; hence the right to equal 
pay for work of equal value is an important synthesis 
of the first two dimensions of the right to equality: 
redressing disadvantage and addressing stigma and 
stereotyping. This step has been taken by both the 
CESCR and the CEDAW Committee. Thus the formal 
requirement in article 7 of ICESCR that women and 
men be given equal pay for equal work is interpreted 
substantively to require equal pay for work of equal 
54 In RKB v Turkey, the CEDAW Committee found that court 
proceedings in relation to a labour matter were based on the 
‘stereotyped perception of the gravity of extramarital affairs 
by women, that extramarital relationships were acceptable 
for men and not for women and that only women had the 
duty to “refrain from even the slightest offence against mo-
rality”’ (CEDAW/C/51/D/28/2010). 
value.55 The same is true for CEDAW.56 However, many 
States do not take the step from a formal to a sub-
stantive approach. The CEDAW Committee regularly 
expresses its concern that equal pay provisions do not 
include the principle of equal pay for work of equal 
value for women and men.57 
Recognition has been central to CEDAW’s approach to 
equality. Under article 5, State parties are required to 
take all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of con-
duct of men and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority 
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereo-
typed roles for men and women; 
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper 
understanding of maternity as a social function and 
the recognition of the common responsibility of men 
and women in the upbringing and development of 
their children, it being understood that the interest 
of the children is the primordial consideration in 
all cases.
55 ICESCR. 2008. “Reporting Guidelines”, para 29; CESCR, 
Ecuador, op. cit., para 15; CESCR, Estonia, op. cit., para 14; 
CESCR, Ethiopia, op. cit., para 11; CESCR. 2012 “Concluding 
Observations Iceland Fourth Periodic Report.” E/C.12/ISL/
CO/4, para 8; CESCR. 2011. “Concluding Observations Israel 
Third Periodic Report.” E/C.12/ISR/CO/3, para 13; CESCR. 
2012. “Concluding Observations New Zealand.” E/C.12/
NZL/CO/3, para 14; CESCR. 2012. “Concluding Observations 
Peru Second, Third and Fourth Periodic Report.” E/C.12/
PER/CO/2-4, para 9; CESCR. 2012. “Concluding Observations 
Second Periodic Report Slovakia.” E/C.12/SVK/CO/2, para 14; 
CESCR. 2012. “Concluding Observations Fifth Periodic Report 
Spain.” E/C.12/ESP/CO/5, para 13; CESCR. 2011. “Concluding 
Observations Turkmenistan.” E/C.12/TKM/CO/1, para 12.
56 CEDAW Committee, Macedonia, op. cit., para 31; CEDAW 
Committee, Bahamas, op. cit., para 33; CEDAW Committee, 
Chile, op. cit., paras 32–33; CEDAW Committee. 2012. 
“Concluding Observations Equatorial Guinea Sixth Periodic 
Report.” CEDAW/C/GNQ/CO/6, para 34.
57 CEDAW Committee, Chile, op. cit., para 32; CEDAW Committee, 
Pakistan, op. cit. paras 29–30.
Gender Equality 
and Human Rights 23
(a) Stereotyping
The CEDAW Committee’s concluding observations 
in this study demonstrate the importance of ad-
dressing gender stereotyping in order to achieve 
substantive gender equality. For example, in relation 
to Macedonia, the Committee expresses its concern 
about the persistence of stereotypes that overem-
phasize the traditional role of women as mothers and 
wives, thus undermining their social status and their 
educational and professional careers. It notes with 
particular concern that the media persistently convey 
‘stereotyped and sometimes degrading images of 
women’.58 It therefore calls on the State party to put in 
place a comprehensive policy to overcome stereotypi-
cal attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of 
women and men in society, and to take all appropriate 
measure to raise the media’s awareness of the need 
to promote positive images of women actively par-
ticipating in social, economic and political life and to 
encourage them, through self regulatory mechanisms, 
to address the degrading representation of women 
in the media.59 Similarly, in relation to Austria, the 
Committee expresses its concern at the persistence 
of traditional stereotypes, including responsibility for 
childcare, which affect women’s educational paths 
and ultimately reduce their chances in the labour mar-
ket.60 In relation to the Bahamas, Chile, Pakistan and 
other State parties, the Committee expresses its deep 
concern at the persistence of patriarchal attitudes 
and deep-rooted stereotypes, according to which 
men are considered breadwinners and women family 
caregivers.61 Also highly problematic is the stigma and 
discrimination against women and girls in relation 
58  CEDAW Committee, Macedonia, op. cit., para 20.
59  Ibid., para 21
60 For example, CEDAW Committee, Austria, op. cit., para 22; 
CEDAW Committee, Bulgaria, op. cit., para 21–22; CEDAW 
Committee, Chile, op. cit., para 16; CEDAW Committee, Cyprus, 
op. cit., para 15; CEDAW Committee, Equatorial Guinea, op. cit., 
para 23; CEDAW Committee. 2013. “Concluding Observations 
Greece Seventh Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/GRC/CO/7, para 
18; CEDAW Committee, Guyana, op. cit., para 20; CEDAW 
Committee. 2013 “Concluding Observations Hungary Seventh 
and Eighth Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/HUN/CO/7-8, para 18; 
CEDAW Committee. 2012. ‘Concluding Observations Jamaica 
Sixth and Seventh Combined Periodic Report.’ CEDAW/C/JAM/
CO/6-7, para 27; CEDAW Committee, Mexico, op. cit., para 34.
61 CEDAW Committee, Bahamas, op. cit., para 21; CEDAW 
Committee, Chile, op. cit., para 16–17, CEDAW Committee, 
Pakistan, op. cit., para 21.
to menstruation in many countries, as noted by the 
Special Rapporteur on water (UN General Assembly 
2012a, para. 20).
The ways in which stigma and stereotyping can them-
selves compound disadvantage are given particularly 
helpful attention by the Special Rapporteur on extreme 
poverty in her report on unpaid care work. As she points 
out: ‘Owing to gender stereotypes related to family 
and work, such as “male breadwinners”, “women as 
carers/nurturers”, this generally means that women 
assume the bulk of the work, to the detriment of their 
human rights enjoyment’ (UN General Assembly 2013, 
para. 8). Indeed, she argues ‘The unequal distribution 
of unpaid care work is highly reflective and determi-
native of power relations between women and men. 
Discriminatory gender stereotypes, which construe 
women as second-class citizens whose place is in the 
home, cause and perpetuate this unequal distribution 
of work, rendering women’s equal enjoyment of rights 
impossible. Addressing care responsibilities is thus an 
essential component of the obligations of States to 
ensure gender equality at home, work and in society 
more broadly’ (ibid., para. 13). 
(b) Education: the role of stereotyping
The CEDAW Committee, in the concluding observa-
tions explored in this study, has also consistently 
recognized the role stereotyping in education plays 
in perpetuating women’s disadvantage. According to 
CEDAW article 10(c), States should take all appropriate 
measures to ensure ‘the elimination of any stereo-
typed concept of the roles of men and women at all 
levels and in all forms of education by encouraging 
coeducation and other types of education which will 
help to achieve this aim and, in particular, by the re-
vision of textbooks and school programmes and the 
adaptation of teaching methods.’ This too is reflected 
in the concluding observations. Thus in relation to 
several countries, the Committee expresses its con-
cern at the existence of gender stereotypes in school 
textbooks.62 In relation to Austria, the Committee 
recommends that the State party improve the gender 
awareness of teaching personnel to the ways in which 
62 CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 27; CEDAW 
Committee, Togo, op. cit., paras 30–31.
Gender Equality 
and Human Rights 24
gender stereotypes are reproduced through various 
aspects of schooling.63 The Special Rapporteur on the 
right to education has noted the negative impact of 
gender stereotyping that ‘keep[s] girls in a position 
of subordination and hinders their participation in 
the dynamics of schooling’ (Commission on Human 
Rights 2006, para. 16). The Special Rapporteur on ex-
treme poverty puts it even more strongly: ‘Entrenched 
gender stereotypes about the place of women in the 
home and the family, and the unpaid care work girls 
and women are expected to perform throughout 
their lives, often deprive women and girls of time, au-
tonomy and choice to exercise this right’ (UN General 
Assembly 2013, para. 39). 
(c) Gender-based violence
A further issue that reflects the crucial role of the rec-
ognition dimension concerns gender-based violence, 
which is shockingly pervasive throughout the world. 
Legislation criminalizing assault, murder and other 
forms of violence against the person is standard across 
States. But its pervasive lack of application to gender-
based violence reflects a deep-seated negation of 
women as persons, the antithesis of recognition. This 
in turn both stems from and reinforces gendered pow-
er relations in society. The international treaty bodies 
have robustly endorsed this dimension of equality in 
their expectation that State parties enact legislation 
specifically dealing with domestic and other gender-
based violence, prohibiting such vicious practices as 
female genital mutilation (FGM),64 breast ironing,65 
acid throwing, stove burning, honour killing,66 sexual 
violence at school67 and at work and rape as a result 
of conflict.68 General legislation criminalizing assault 
is not considered sufficient: specific legislation is 
63 CEDAW Committee, Austria, op. cit., para 22.
64 CESCR, Cameroon, op. cit., para 20.
65 Ibid. ‘‘Breast ironing’, or ‘flattening’, aims to stem the growth 
of the breasts in the hope that it will help prevent un-
wanted male attention and delay a girl’s sexual activity. It is 
usually carried out by the mother or another member of the 
family, sometimes, even the girl herself. For some mothers 
the alternative for their daughters seems much worse. The 
average age of rape victims in Cameroon is 15’(Hall 2013).
66  CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., para 21.
67  CESCR, Ecuador, op. cit., para 21.
68 HRC. 2012. “Concluding Observations Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Second Periodic Report.” CCPR/C/BIH/CO/2, para 8.
required, such as making domestic violence specifi-
cally punishable by law.69 
At the very heart of the negation of women as wor-
thy of equal respect is the refusal by many States to 
criminalize marital rape.70 At the other end of the con-
tinuum is sexual harassment at work, the recognition 
of which has been a direct result of the development 
of substantive equality, but which many countries still 
do not address.71 Abuse and sexual harassment of girls 
at schools function as major barriers to the education 
of young girls and women.72 This then compounds 
women’s disadvantage. Recognition issues are com-
pounded for women with intersectional identities, 
such as Maori women in New Zealand, Aboriginal 
women in Canada73 and women with disabilities,74 
against whom violence abounds. 
The need to eliminate stigma, prejudice and stereotyp-
ing does not end, however, with criminalization. In the 
concluding observations reviewed in this study, the 
treaty bodies consistently stress the importance of the 
need to change attitudes, among both the commu-
nity in general and those responsible for compliance. 
Thus even in countries that have enacted legislation 
against gender-based violence, the persistence of such 
violence has prompted the treaty committees to insist 
on effective law enforcement through investigation, 
conviction, punishment and compensation, together 
with national awareness campaigns or ‘sensitization’ 
among the population and systematic training of 
69 HRC, Macao, China, op. cit., para 18; CESCR, Peru, op. cit., para 
10; CESCR. 2012. “Concluding Observations Bulgaria Fourth 
and Fifth Periodic Report.” E/C.12/BGR/CO/4-5, para 15; CESCR, 
Estonia, op. cit., para 20; CESCR, Iceland, op. cit., para 15; 
CESCR, Israel, op. cit., para 18.
70 CESCR, Cameroon, op. cit., para 20; CESCR, Ethiopia, op. cit., 
para 14.
71 HRC, Macao, China, op. cit., para 18; CESCR, Cameroon, op. cit., 
para 20; CESCR, Slovakia, op. cit., para 16.
72 CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., paras 30-31.
73 CERD Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Canada 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Combined Periodic Report.” 
CERD/C/CAN/CO/19-20, para 17; CESCR, New Zealand, op. cit., 
para 18.
74 CPRD Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Argentina 
First Periodic Report CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1, para 29; HRC. 2013. 
“Concluding Observations Hong Kong, China Third Periodic 
Report.” CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/3, para 57; HRC, Macao, China, 
op. cit., para 90. [pls check-fixed]
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public officers involved.75 For example, in relation to 
Iceland, the CESCR expressed its concern at persist-
ing attitudes and stereotypes leading to violence 
against women.76 Similarly in relation to Estonia, the 
CESCR noted with concern the absence of large-scale 
awareness-raising campaigns on domestic violence in 
the country’s development plan for the reduction and 
prevention of violence, and recommended that ‘the 
State party conduct media campaigns targeting all 
segments of the population with a view to changing 
the society’s attitudes regarding domestic violence.’77 
The CEDAW Committee has highlighted the par-
ticular challenges faced by migrant women and their 
heightened vulnerability to sexual harassment, abuse 
and physical violence.78
Similarly, the CEDAW Committee expressly makes 
the connection between misrecognition and violence 
when it points to the ways in which stereotypes 
contribute to the persistence of violence against 
women.79 It points this out in relation to Togo with 
reference to violent and harmful practices including 
polygamy, forced and early marriage, FGM and bond-
age.80 Similarly, in relation to Greece, it notes that 
patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of women and 
men perpetuate discrimination against women and 
girls and are reflected in the persistence of violence 
against them.81 Lack of recognition also means that 
fewer women are able to report their experience of vi-
olence. In addition, the Committee notes with concern 
that despite the criminalization of FGM, it remains 
highly prevalent in rural areas in Ethiopia. As well as 
recommending proper enforcement, it urges the State 
party to raise awareness among women and girls to 
75  HRC, Angola, op. cit., para 10; HRC, Belize,op. cit., para 15; 
HRC, Hong Kong, China, op. cit., para 18; CESCR, Bulgaria, op. 
cit., para 15; CESCR, Cameroon, op. cit., para 20; CESCR, Peru, 
op. cit., para 14.
76  CESCR, Iceland, op. cit., para 15; CESCR, Israel, op. cit., para 18.
77  CESCR, Estonia, op. cit., para 20.
78  CEDAW Committee. 2009. “General Recommendation No 26 
on women migrant workers.” CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R. 
79  CEDAW Committee, Bahamas, op. cit., para 21. Also see V.K. v 
Bulgaria, CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008; Vertido v The Philippines, 
CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008.
80  CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 21.
81  CEDAW Committee, Greece, op. cit., para 18; CEDAW 
Committee, Indonesia, op. cit., para 23.
encourage reporting of criminal acts and, equally 
important, to ensure that those to whom they report 
provide adequate assistance.82 In Pakistan, although 
honour killing is now criminalized, perpetrators are of-
ten pardoned, or not prosecuted and punished under 
the Qisas and Diyat ordinances, which allow private 
parties to pursue their grievances through retribution 
and vengeance.83
Perhaps the strongest antithesis of the principle of 
recognition of people as worthy of respect comes 
from human trafficking, which is compounded in the 
case of women when overlaid with sexual violence or 
compulsion and forced prostitution. All the commit-
tees repeatedly express their concern at the extent of 
human trafficking, particularly among women and 
girls for sexual exploitation.84 This includes internal 
trafficking as in Pakistan where children, especially 
girls, are then subjected to bonded labour, domestic 
servitude and child marriage.85 Here too, the commit-
tees see part of the solution lying in public awareness 
campaigns,86 in addition to proper policing, repara-
tions and shelters.
(d) Stigma, stereotyping, prejudice 
and violence as compounding material 
disadvantage 
In this context, as with others, it is important to 
see the ways in which the different dimensions of 
equality need to work together. All the committees 
are highly aware of the importance of the role of 
stereotyping and prejudice in sustaining disadvan-
tage within marriage. It is not sufficient to change 
the law: there also needs to be an underlying change 
82  CESCR, Ethiopia, op. cit., para 14.
83  CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., para 22.
84  HRC, Angola, op. cit., para 17; HRC, Belize, op. cit., para 17; 
HRC, the Philippines, op. cit., para 18; HRC, Macao, China, 
op. cit., para 13; HRC, Hong Kong, China, op. cit., para 20; 
CESCR, Peru, op. cit., para 20; CESCR, Slovakia, op. cit., para 19; 
CESCR, Turkmenistan, op. cit., para 17; CERD Committee. 2012. 
“Concluding Observations Republic of Korea Fifteenth and 
Sixteenth Combined Periodic Report.” CERD/C/KOR/CO/15-
16, para 16; CERD Committee. 2011. “Concluding Observations 
Maldives Fifth thru Twelfth Periodic Report.” CERD/C/MDV/
CO/5-12, para 12; CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 21. 
85  CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., para 23.
86  CESCR, Slovakia, op. cit., para 19; CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, 
op. cit., para 23.
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in the ways in which women are regarded within 
the culture. Thus in relation to several countries, 
the CEDAW Committee recommends that the State 
party sensitize traditional leaders on the impor-
tance of eliminating discriminatory practices such 
as polygamy and early marriage and put an end to 
customary laws that discriminate against women in 
relation to the inheritance of land.87 
Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food 
has highlighted that women face multiple forms of 
discrimination in accessing land (HRC 2012a, para. 15). 
He notes that inheritance laws discriminate against 
women in many countries, but that discriminatory 
social and cultural norms prevail even where these 
are removed. He gives the following example: ‘Where 
a sister could inherit land on an equal basis with her 
brothers, she may accept a lump-sum payment in lieu 
of her portion of the land in order to maintain good 
relations with her brothers’. The Special Rapporteur 
on the right to housing has also identified the lack of 
equality in inheritance laws, customs and traditions 
that lead to harsh impacts on women’s housing 
rights (HRC 2011a, para. 8). Inequality in relation to 
marital property has the same effect (ibid., paras. 
9–10). 
Lack of recognition of women’s unpaid work also 
affects laws dealing with land acquired during mar-
riage. The Special Rapporteur on the right to food 
notes that in some regions, particularly in South Asia, 
‘a separation of property regime is applied, according 
to which assets brought into the marriage or acquired 
during marriage remain the individual property of the 
spouse who acquired said assets from his or her per-
sonal funds’ (HRC 2012, para 15). This leads to ‘deeply 
inequitable outcomes, as it does not recognize the 
important non-monetary contribution that women 
make to the household by looking after the house, 
child-rearing, caring for the elderly, or various other 
chores’ (ibid., para. 15).
Violence and material disadvantage mutually ag-
gravate each other in a vicious downward cycle. The 
87  CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 36; CEDAW 
Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 41.
Special Rapporteur on the right to housing, pointing 
to the link between violence against women in the 
home and violations of women’s housing rights, has 
urged that women victims of domestic violence be 
able to access emergency shelter, transitional ac-
commodation and social housing when forced to 
leave their homes (HRC 2011a, para. 19). The Special 
Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights has 
noted that gender-based violence and sexual harass-
ment may act as barriers to women’s participation in 
social protection programmes and has recommended 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms be built 
into such programmes to take account of these reali-
ties (UN General Assembly 2010, para. 64).
Stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence also 
compound material disadvantage in relation to 
health. In particular, socio-cultural norms need to be 
recognized as barriers to women’s basic health care.88 
This is stressed in relation to maternal mortality by 
the Special Rapporteur on health, who has linked the 
provision of health services to issues of substantive 
gender discrimination in practice: ‘Preventing ma-
ternal mortality and enhancing access to maternal 
health care is not simply about scaling up technical 
interventions or making the interventions affordable. 
It is also vital to address social, cultural, political and 
legal factors which influence women’s decisions 
to seek maternal or other reproductive health-care 
services. This may require addressing discriminatory 
laws, policies, practices and gender inequalities that 
prevent women and adolescents from seeking good 
quality services’ (UN General Assembly 2006, para. 17).
Stigmatization is particularly problematic when it is 
officially sanctioned by the State, through the crimi-
nal law. One of the key areas in which this can be seen 
is in relation to sexual and reproductive health. As 
the Special Rapporteur on the right to health puts 
it, ‘where the criminal law is used as a tool by the 
State to regulate the conduct and decision-making of 
individuals in the context of the right to sexual and re-
productive health the State coercively substitutes its 
will for that of the individual’ (UN General Assembly 
2011, para. 12). 
88  CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 35.
Gender Equality 
and Human Rights 27
Such laws both stigmatize and compound women’s 
disadvantage. Thus, he states: ‘The causal relationship 
between the gender stereotyping, discrimination 
and marginalization of women and girls and their 
enjoyment of their right to sexual and reproductive 
health is well documented. Criminalization gener-
ates and perpetuates stigma; restricts their ability 
to make full use of available sexual and reproductive 
health-care goods, services and information; denies 
their full participation in society; and distorts percep-
tions among health-care professionals which, as a 
consequence, can hinder their access to health-care 
services. Criminal laws and other legal restrictions dis-
empower women, who may be deterred from taking 
steps to protect their health, in order to avoid liability 
and out of fear of stigmatization. By restricting access 
to sexual and reproductive health-care goods, services 
and information these laws can also have a discrimi-
natory effect, in that they disproportionately affect 
those in need of such resources, namely women. As a 
result, women and girls are punished both when they 
abide by these laws, and are thus subjected to poor 
physical and mental health outcomes, and when they 
do not, and thus face incarceration’ (ibid., para. 17).
The Special Rapporteur on water has paid particu-
lar attention to the role of stigma in perpetuating 
discrimination: ‘Identifying human rights violations 
as rooted in stigma demands an exploration of the 
origins of discrimination and other human rights vio-
lations. To start, speaking openly about what seems 
“unmentionable” can act as an eye-opener, precisely 
because stigma is instrumental in propagating silence 
and imposing a culture of invisibility and shame, al-
lowing human rights violations to continue unabated 
and with impunity’ (HRC 2012b, para. 6).  
Stigmatized people such as homeless people and 
women who are menstruating or suffering from 
obstetric fistula are often perceived as ‘dirty’ (ibid., 
para. 13). Menstruation is often associated with nega-
tive cultural practices such as: ‘the seclusion of women 
and girls, reduced mobility, dietary restrictions, and/or 
women and girls being required to use different water 
sources or prohibited from preparing food for others 
during menstruation – practices that are often deeply 
rooted in sociocultural and patriarchal interpretations 
of religious prescriptions. Even where such restrictions 
are not followed, women and girls may continue to 
harbour internalized stigma and are embarrassed to 
discuss menstruation. The lack of privacy for cleaning 
and washing, the fear of staining and smelling, and 
the lack of hygiene in school toilets are major reasons 
for being absent from school during menstruation, 
and have a negative impact on girls’ right to educa-
tion’ (ibid., para. 25.) 
(e) Intersectionality
Issues of stigma and stereotyping are particularly 
salient in relation to multiple identities, where it is 
easy for the intersectional identity to be invisible. The 
CERD Committee notes that racial discrimination may 
primarily affect women, or affect them in different 
ways or to a greater degree than men in some circum-
stances. Examples include sexual violence committed 
against women members of particular racial or ethnic 
groups in detention or during armed conflict and the 
coerced sterilization of indigenous women (CERD 
Committee 2000, paras. 1–2). The CEDAW Committee 
recommends greater recognition of multiple forms of 
discrimination faced by certain women on grounds of 
sexual orientation, gender identity, indigenous origin 
or being HIV/AIDS positive.89 In Kell v Canada, the 
CEDAW Committee found that an aboriginal woman’s 
property rights were violated when she fled her home 
following domestic violence.90
89  CEDAW Committee, Chile, op. cit., paras 16–17.
90  CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008.
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2.3	
Accommodation and transformation
This dimension is challenging for equality law. It 
entails accommodation of difference and changes 
in structures that impede women’s equality. This 
requires careful distinctions to be drawn between 
differential treatment that entrenches women’s dis-
advantage and that which advances equality. Thus 
‘special measures’ for women advance women’s 
equality but ‘protective’ legislation, such as excluding 
women from work deemed unsafe, is more problem-
atic. This distinction appears clearly in the CESCR’s 
Concluding Observations on Turkmenistan. Noting 
with concern that certain professions are not acces-
sible to women on the ground of protecting their 
physical well-being, it instead recommends that cur-
rent obstacles for women in employment be reviewed 
and that the country adopt temporary special mea-
sures to promote the access of women to all types of 
employment and occupation.91 The HRC has said that 
the ICCPR requires State parties to ‘not only adopt 
measures of protection, but also positive measures 
in all areas so as to achieve the effective and equal 
empowerment of women’ (HRC 2000, para. 3). The 
CESCR has adopted the term ‘substantive equality’ 
and has said that laws, policies and practices of State 
parties may perpetuate inequality between men and 
women because they do not take account of existing 
economic, social and cultural inequalities experienced 
by women (CESCR 2005).
The Special Rapporteur on the right to food has given 
particular emphasis to a transformative approach 
as part of a human rights-based strategy to address 
gender discrimination. He notes that: ‘As long as we 
simply recognize the role of women in the “care” 
economy by accommodating their specific needs, 
the existing division of roles within the household 
and associated gender stereotypes will remain in 
place, and could even be reinforced. Redistributing 
roles and challenging the associated gender stereo-
types require a transformative approach, whereby 
the support provided to women not only recognizes 
their specific needs, but provides the opportunity to 
91  CESCR, Turkmenistan, op. cit., para 12.
question existing social and cultural norms’ (HRC 
2012a, para. 18).He explains that this transformative 
approach, supported by the language of CEDAW, re-
quires that women’s special needs are simultaneously 
accommodated while traditional gender divisions are 
subverted.
(a) Temporary special measures
Temporary special measures are a key aspect of the 
transformative dimension of substantive equality. 
This dimension is stressed by the HRC with surpris-
ing robustness in relation to under-representation of 
women in politics and in the public and private sectors, 
where State parties are regularly urged to institute 
temporary special measures to address the problem.92 
Article 4(1) of CEDAW requires State parties to makes 
it clear that temporary special measures aimed at 
accelerating de facto equality between women and 
men should not be considered discriminatory, but 
they should be discontinued when the objectives of 
equality of opportunity and treatment have been 
achieved. (This contrasts with special measures, such 
as those aimed at protecting maternity, which should 
not be temporary – article 4(2).) Although temporary 
special measures are permissive, rather than manda-
tory, the CEDAW Committee encourages State parties 
to take such measures in order to correct under-rep-
resentation of women in any area in which it occurs, 
particularly in relation to the inclusion of women in 
decision-making. This should include ‘outreach and 
support programmes, quotas and other pro-active 
and result-oriented measures aimed at achieving sub-
stantive equality of women with men in all areas’.93 
Even when some special measures, such as quotas 
for women in the National Assembly, are in place, the 
CEDAW Committee will encourage such measures to 
be used more widely in all areas in which women are 
under-represented or disadvantaged.94
92  HRC, Angola, op. cit., para 9; HRC, Belize, op. cit., para 12; HRC, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, op. cit., para 10; HRC the Philippines, 
op. cit., 9; HRC. 2013. “Concluding Observations Peru Fifth 
Periodic Report.” CCPR/C/PER/CO/5, para 9; see also CESCR, 
Mauritania, op. cit., para 11; CESCR, Slovakia, op. cit., para 11.
93  CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 15–16.
94  CEDAW Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 18–19.
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(b) Reproduction
Transformation requires an acknowledgement of the 
extent to which existing structures perpetuate inequal-
ity, and therefore that simply requiring like treatment 
will only assist those who can conform to existing 
structures. Instead, difference must be accommodated 
by changing structures. This is most salient in relation 
to women’s reproductive role. While pregnancy and 
childbirth are uniquely female, childcare and parenting 
are not. Substantive equality requires stereotypical ex-
pectations in relation to childcare to be dislodged while 
insisting that pregnancy and childbirth receive specific 
treatment. This has been acknowledged by the com-
mittees in the attention paid to women’s reproductive 
health, abortion, contraception, early marriage and 
teenage pregnancy. Thus it is recognized that control 
over their own reproduction is central to women’s abil-
ity to participate on equal terms in society. 
For the ICCPR, this is achieved by interpreting the right 
to life from the perspective of substantive equality. 
Thus the Reporting Guidelines on article 6, the right 
to life, require States to provide information on birth 
rates and pregnancy and childbirth-related deaths of 
women, as well as measures taken to help women 
prevent unwanted pregnancies and to ensure they 
do not have to undergo life threatening clandestine 
abortions (ICCPR 2012). In the concluding observations 
examined in this survey, all the committees frequently 
expressed concern at the absolute ban on abortions 
and the lack of availability of free contraception, and 
stress the right to reproductive health.95 In LC v Peru 
the CEDAW Committee required the State party to 
provide an appropriate legal framework for thera-
peutic abortion providing for rapid decision-making 
to avoid risk to the pregnant mother. This decision re-
lated to a situation where a 13-year-old girl, pregnant 
following rape and injured after an attempted suicide, 
95 HRC, the Philippines, op. cit., para 13; HRC, Peru, op. cit., para 
14; CESCR, Argentina, op. cit., para 22; CESCR, Bulgaria, op. cit., 
para 20; CESCR, Cameroon, op. cit., para 22; CESCR, Ecuador, 
op. cit., para 28; CESCR, Peru, op. cit., para 2; CESCR, United 
Republic of Tanzania, op. cit., para 24; CEDAW Committee, 
Macedonia, op. cit., para 33; CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. 
cit., para 27; CEDAW Committee, Chile, op. cit., paras 34–35; 
CEDAW Committee, Pakistan, op. cit., paras 31–32; CEDAW 
Committee, Jordan, op. cit., para 39–40.
was not given an abortion that could have prevented 
her from becoming permanently disabled.96 
For both the CESCR and the CEDAW Committee, a 
gendered reading of the rights to health and educa-
tion lead to specific attention to reproductive rights, 
teenage pregnancy and maternal mortality.97 This 
also has specific ramifications for women in relation 
to HIV and AIDS. Thus the CEDAW Committee points 
to the disproportionately high number of women 
in Angola living with HIV and AIDS and the need for 
more effective implementation of national strategies 
on combating the spread of the virus.98  
A further aspect of transformation, mentioned above 
in relation to recognition, concerns the importance of 
addressing and changing stereotypical roles in society. 
For example, changes in the law on birth control are 
recognized as being insufficient on their own and 
should be supplemented by education and aware-
ness-raising programmes on the significance of using 
contraceptives and the right to reproductive health.99 
From an intersectional perspective, the issue of free 
choice of contraception manifests itself in the op-
posite direction: preventing forced sterilization. Thus 
in the concluding observations in this study the CRPD 
Committee consistently calls for States to insist on in-
formed choice on the part of women with disabilities 
in relation to both abortion and sterilization.100 In other 
countries, such as Peru, forced sterilization was used as 
part of a campaign of eugenics and population control 
against poor and ethnic minority women, a crime for 
which, by 2012, victims had not received reparation.101
96   CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009.
97    CEDAW Committee, Bulgaria, op. cit., para 36; CEDAW 
Committee, Chile, op. cit., paras 34–35.
98   CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 27–28.
99    HRC, the Philippines, op. cit., para 13; HRC, Peru, op. cit., para 
14; CESCR, Slovakia, op. cit., para 25; CESCR, United Republic 
of Tanzania, op. cit., para 24.
100  CRPD Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations Argentina 
First Periodic Report.” CRPD/C/ARG/CO/1, para 31–32; CRPD 
Committee. 2012. “Concluding Observations China First 
Periodic Report.” CRPD/C/CHI/CO/1, para 33–34; CRPD 
Committee. 2011. “Concluding Observations Spain First 
Periodic Report.” CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, paras 37–38.
101  HRC, Peru, op. cit., para 13.
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(c) Education
A third key issue for the transformational dimension 
of substantive equality concerns the right to educa-
tion. This is transformational at a fundamental level: 
education itself gives girls and women the potential 
to change structures of oppression through attain-
ing skills allowing them to enter the paid labour 
force and unravel structures of domination. For 
example, in Ethiopia, the CESCR noted with concern 
the very low literacy rates in rural areas, particularly 
among women and girls, as well as the gender gap 
in enrolment. It recommended that the State party 
should take urgent steps generally to increase pri-
mary school enrolment and particularly to address 
the gender gap.102 
But education itself needs to be changed to accom-
modate the specific disadvantage experienced by 
women. Particularly important is the need to accom-
modate pregnant learners.103 This can be done both 
by reducing teenage pregnancies and by providing 
support services, including measures to enable preg-
nant girls and women to continue their studies.104 
Thus in relation to the United Republic of Tanzania, 
the CESCR notes that the high dropout rate from 
secondary education is due in part to expulsions 
following positive mandatory pregnancy tests and 
early marriage. It recommends that mandatory 
pregnancy testing be abolished and expulsions due 
to pregnancy prohibited.105 The CEDAW Committee 
similarly stresses the need to eliminate the practice 
of early marriage and to enable young women to 
stay in school during pregnancy and to return to 
school after giving birth.106 Another issue is the need 
to train female teachers.107
102 CESCR, Ethiopia, op. cit., para 26; CESCR, Peru, op. cit., para 26.
103  HRC, Belize, op. cit., para 23.
104  CESCR, Bulgaria, op. cit., para 20; CESCR, Cameroon, op. cit., 
para 22; CESCR, Estonia, op. cit., para 24; CESCR, Peru, op. cit., 
para 21; CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 27; CEDAW 
Committee, Chile, op. cit., paras 28–29.
105  CESCR, United Republic of Tanzania, op. cit., para 27.
106  CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 27; CEDAW 
Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 30; CEDAW Committee, 
Pakistan, op. cit., paras 27–28.
107   CESCR, Ethiopia, op. cit., para 26; CEDAW Committee, 
Pakistan, op. cit., para 28.
(d) Work/life balance
The final key aspect of a transformative approach is 
to insist on changes to working patterns in order to 
facilitate women’s ability to enter the paid labour 
force on more equal terms. This requires policies on 
childcare, parental leave and working time, as the 
CEDAW Committee recognizes. Thus in relation to 
Macedonia, it is concerned that the lack of such poli-
cies forces women into part-time and low-paid work 
and reinforces the unequal division of family respon-
sibilities between women and men.108 Similarly, in 
relation to Chile (and other State parties), the CEDAW 
Committee recommends increased efforts to assist 
women and men to strike a balance between family 
and employment so that they can both adequately 
share domestic and childcare tasks.109
Crucial for the transformation of women’s role in 
childcare is to ensure not only that women are not 
prejudiced at work by pregnancy and maternity, but 
also that men are included in childcare. The ICESCR 
reporting guidelines under article 5 (the right to fam-
ily) require States to give information on the system of 
maternity protection in the workplace, and in particu-
lar whether it applies to women involved in atypical 
work. It also asks whether paternity leave is granted 
to men and parental leave to both men and women 
(ICESCR 2008, para. 36), an issue that is also stressed 
by the CEDAW Committee.110 
The CEDAW Committee also encourages a transfor-
mative approach to the problem of poverty among 
older women caused by interruptions in their pen-
sion contributions due to childcare responsibilities. 
Contracting States are urged not just to rectify 
disparities in the pension system resulting from the 
different roles of women and men in childcare, but 
also to change existing structures by intensifying 
efforts to facilitate the re-entry of mothers into 
the labour market after childbirth and encourag-
ing men to share responsibility for childcare.111 The 
108 CEDAW Committee, Macedonia, op. cit., para 31.
109  CEDAW Committee, Chile, op. cit., paras 16–17.
110  CEDAW Committee, Bulgaria, op. cit., para 34.
111   CEDAW Committee, Austria, op. cit., para 37; CEDAW 
Committee, Chile, op. cit., paras 36–37.
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CESCR has also stressed the need for State parties to 
take steps to eliminate the factors that prevent 
women from making equal contributions to social 
security schemes – for example, intermittent par-
ticipation in the workforce on account of family 
responsibilities and unequal wage outcomes (CESCR 
2007, para. 32).
(e) Trafficking
The transformative approach to equality is particu-
larly noticeable in the CEDAW Committee’s approach 
to human trafficking, where it recommends not just 
proper enforcement but also the need to ‘address the 
root causes of prostitution of women and girls, includ-
ing poverty, in order to eliminate their vulnerability to 
sexual exploitation and trafficking, and strengthen 
efforts for the rehabilitation and social reintegration 
of victims’.112
 
 
(f) Intersectionality
As in other areas, it is those women with intersec-
tional identities that need particular attention. Thus the 
CEDAW Committee has expressed particular concern 
at the notably high dropout rates of Roma girls and 
women in some State parties. Here too it is not enough 
simply to espouse a policy of equal access: a more trans-
formative approach is needed that, in the words of the 
CEDAW Committee, requires States to address barriers 
to the education of women and girls, including negative 
cultural attitudes and excessive domestic duties, and to 
implement re-entry policies.113 In Alyne da Silva Pimentel 
Teixeira (deceased) v Brazil the CEDAW Committee found 
that Ms da Silva Pimentel Teixeira’s death following 
inadequate obstetric care was discrimination on the 
basis of sex in conjunction with her status as a woman 
of African descent and her socio-economic background. 
The Committee required Brazil to put in place training 
of medical, judicial and law enforcement personnel on 
women’s reproductive rights.114
2.4	
Agency and voice: the participative dimension
The participative dimension of substantive equality 
operates in several different ways. The first relates to 
the extent to which women are represented in the 
workforce, particularly in higher grades and in tradi-
tionally male-dominated areas. In this context, the 
participative and redistributive dimensions operate 
closely together. The second concerns women’s par-
ticipation in decision-making and power structures in 
society, whether representative, bureaucratic or corpo-
rate. The third is closer to a notion of social inclusion 
and is concerned with the extent to which women 
are participants in community life or are secluded in 
the household, or are otherwise invisible. In all these 
areas, but particularly the first two, there is inevitably 
a focus on numerical outcomes, with the aim being 
to increase numbers of women in higher grades or in 
decision-making. Care therefore needs to be taken to 
read this dimension together with the redistributive, 
112  CEDAW Committee, Angola, op. cit., para 21; CEDAW 
Committee, Togo, op. cit., para 25; CEDAW Committee, Chile, 
op. cit., paras 40–41.
recognition and transformational dimensions. For  
example, an increase in women in higher grades of an 
occupation might coincide with a lowering of status, 
thus decreasing both the redistributive and recogni-
tion measures of substantive equality and possibly 
negating the gains in the participative dimension. 
Alternatively, more women might be employed in 
higher grades without changing male-dominated 
working hours, so that childcare is simply delegated to 
other low-paid women. In this way, the participative 
and even redistributive measures might be improved 
but no transformational gains will be made. 
The Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and hu-
man rights argues for a human rights-based approach 
to participation that addresses the empowerment 
of people to engage in decision-making that af-
fects their lives. The principles underlying the right 
113   CEDAW Committee, Macedonia, op. cit., para 30; CEDAW 
Committee, Bulgaria, op. cit., para 31.
114 CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008.
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to participation are dignity, non-discrimination and 
equality (HRC 2013a, para. 5). ‘Poverty is not solely a 
lack of income, but rather is characterized by a vicious 
cycle of powerlessness, stigmatization, discrimination, 
exclusion and material deprivation, which all mutually 
reinforce each other’ (ibid., para. 4). The vicious cycle 
means that ‘the greater the inequality, the less the 
participation; the less the participation, the greater 
the inequality’ (ibid., para. 5). Lack of participation is 
both a cause and consequence of poverty. Poverty is 
itself a ground of discrimination, but people living in 
poverty often experience other forms of discrimina-
tion based on, for example, gender, disability, ethnicity, 
and so on.
Gender equality must be a special focus in designing, 
implementing and monitoring participatory processes 
(ibid., para. 11). Participation requires the elimination of 
power differentials by challenging systemic inequali-
ties. Thus, participation, as part of the four-dimensional 
substantive equality framework, requires similar atten-
tion to the other dimensions – redressing disadvantage, 
addressing stigma, prejudice and stereotyping, and 
transformation – because without these, inequality 
persists and full participation cannot occur. Particular 
attention must be paid to the underlying gender 
relations of the groups or individuals involved. States 
should take into account the different experiences of 
women and men and gender power relations in the 
community. They must recognize the multiple forms 
of discrimination that women experience and ad-
dress women’s specific needs throughout the different 
phases of their life cycle. Participatory processes must 
also acknowledge the responsibilities of care provid-
ers without reinforcing patterns of discrimination and 
negative stereotyping.
Participatory processes should focus on those most 
marginalized and excluded. The process of identifying 
vulnerable groups should involve a gender analysis 
and ‘members of both sexes must be given the chance 
to represent their views, including, if necessary, 
through specially targeted consultations (for ex-
ample, women-only spaces) and support’ (ibid., para. 
12). Care responsibilities, illiteracy and personal safety 
are some of the factors that affect the accessibility of 
participatory measures for women.
The principle of the interdependence of rights means 
that the right to participation is linked to many of the 
civil and political rights such as expression, assembly 
and access to justice and also to social and economic 
rights such as education, health and water, the envi-
ronment and the rights of indigenous peoples. All of 
these are closely related to rights to non-discrimina-
tion and equality.
So far as greater representation in decision-making 
is concerned, care needs to be taken to ensure that 
greater numbers of women in decision-making in fact 
increase their influence on decisions. In countries with 
strong familial kinship structures, it is possible that 
the presence of women is as a proxy for their hus-
bands or male relatives. If this is the case, an increase 
in representation would not contribute to the trans-
formative or redistributive dimensions of substantive 
equality. There is also a risk, particularly in relation to 
greater representation, that women might be essen-
tialized and assumed to be in a position to speak for 
or represent all women. Yet there may be significant 
diversity among women with different intersectional 
identities, such as older women, women from eth-
nic minorities, lesbian women, religious women or 
women with disabilities. In addition, women’s repre-
sentatives may sometimes hold conservative views on 
gender issues. As discussed above, the participation 
dimension must interact with the other dimensions 
of substantive equality to ensure that gender inequal-
ity is fully addressed.  
All the treaty bodies take the participative dimension 
seriously, although they generally use a broad-brush 
approach to the different strands of the question. The 
ICCPR reporting guidelines require States to report on 
‘the proportion of women in positions of responsibility 
in both the public and the private sector and the mea-
sures taken to promote the representation of women 
in Parliament and in senior positions in Government 
as well as in the private sector’ (ICCPR 2010, para. 
38). Concluding observations covered in this study 
regularly express concern that women remain under-
represented in public and political affairs, particularly 
in the government and judiciary, and State parties are 
urged to strengthen their efforts to increase this 
participation, if necessary through temporary special 
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measures.115 The emphasis on numerical monitoring 
is reflected in consistent encouragement of States 
to collect and present disaggregated statistical data, 
which are often lacking, particularly in the private sec-
tor.116 Yet the importance of combining such measures 
with structural change or a transformative dimension 
could receive more attention. 
One important example is seen in the HRC’s disap-
pointment in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where, despite the introduction of quotas requiring 
parties to nominate at least 30 per cent of women 
candidates and incentives for parliamentary funding 
for political parties with women’s representation in 
the Parliamentary Assembly, women remain under-
represented in legislative and executive bodies at all 
levels of government.117 Nor does representation in the 
public sector necessarily signal participation in the 
private sector. Thus in relation to Germany, the HRC 
likewise expressed its disappointment that, while 
noting progress made to promote equality between 
women and men in Parliament and the judiciary, 
the representation of women in leading positions in 
the private sector remained low.118 Regarding Jordan, 
while commending the introduction of a quota of 25 
per cent of women in local government, the CEDAW 
Committee was concerned that similar strategies 
were not being used in other areas including employ-
ment and education.119 
The Working Group on the issue of discrimination 
against women in law and in practice has produced 
a special report on women’s political representation 
(HRC 2013b). It finds that despite commitments at 
the international level, progress is still very slow in 
improving women’s representation (ibid., paras. 6–8). 
115 HRC, Angola, op. cit., para 9; HRC, Belize, op. cit., para 12; HRC, 
the Philippines op. cit., para 9; HRC, Portugal, op. cit., para 4; 
HRC, Peru, op. cit., para 9; CESCR, Mauritania, op. cit., para 11; 
CESCR, Slovakia, op. cit., para 11.
116  HRC, Angola, op. cit., para 9; HRC, Belize, op. cit., para 12.
117  HRC, Bosnia and Herzegovina, op. cit., para 10.
118  HRC, Germany, op. cit., para 8.
119  CEDAW Committee, Jordan, op. cit., para 21.
At present there is an average of 20 per cent of women 
in the national parliaments of the world, and women’s 
representation in government is far lower than their 
representation in parliament. They account for 27 
per cent of the judiciary. Special measures, including 
quotas, are necessary to achieve equality between 
women and men by addressing structural disadvan-
tage faced by women. But greater numbers of women 
representatives are not sufficient to advance gender 
equality in society. Broader participation of women and 
autonomous women’s organizations are critical to the 
achievement of policy that advances substantive equal-
ity between women and men. Undemocratic practices 
at local levels such as patronage and corruption prevent 
transparency and accountability and reduce women’s 
effective participation (ibid., para. 12). Similarly, exemp-
tion for certain religious and indigenous communities 
that prevent women from holding leadership positions 
may limit women’s representation. ‘Stereotypes of 
female inadequacy in politics continue to be used as 
a basis for their marginalization and segregation in 
decision-making positions’ (ibid., para. 16).
Intersectionality
The effect of intersectionality on political repre-
sentation is emphasized by the Working Group, 
which shows that additional discrimination on the 
grounds of race, caste, ethnicity, etc. can also lead to 
‘multiple stereotyping’. This is particularly true for 
disability. The CRPD Committee stresses the need for 
meaningful participation of people with disabilities, 
particularly the involvement of children and women 
with disabilities in the design of legislation and in 
other matters affecting them (2010, paras. 8–9). The 
CERD Committee notes that women may lack access 
to remedies and complaint mechanisms for racial 
discrimination because of gender-related impedi-
ments, such as gender bias in the legal system and 
discrimination against women in the private sphere 
(2000, para. 2). The CEDAW Committee has pointed to 
obstacles to participation faced by older women such 
as lack of identification and transportation as well as 
mandatory lower retirement ages (2010, para. 17).
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2.5	
Evaluation and discussion
The above analysis illustrates that the four-dimension-
al framework of substantive gender equality set out 
in the first part of this paper is implicitly followed in 
the recent observations and recommendations of the 
human rights treaty bodies and special procedures 
mandate holders. These groups and individuals rou-
tinely locate their work on gender equality within the 
four dimensions set out above, even if this is not always 
explicitly stated. This is an encouraging trend as it re-
flects a deep understanding within the human rights 
system of the need for a sophisticated approach to 
equality to achieve far-reaching change in challenging 
complex inequalities. This evaluation now highlights 
some of the key areas where the treaty bodies are 
consistently strong in relation to women’s rights. It also 
considers those issues where these bodies might give 
greater or more sustained attention in addressing gen-
der equality. Thereafter, we briefly discuss some of the 
possibilities and limits of international human rights in 
achieving concrete changes to women’s lives and look 
at some of the strategic considerations that inform a 
politics around women’s rights.  
The analysis of the pronouncements of the treaty 
bodies discussed above demonstrates that various 
core issues related to women’s rights are mentioned 
consistently. Thus, equality in marriage is referred to 
specifically in the ICCPR (article 23) and CEDAW (arti-
cle 16). Women’s representation in political structures 
is also a regular concern of the HRC and the CEDAW 
Committee. There is overlap between the CESCR and 
the CEDAW Committee on some of the major social 
and economic rights, such as health and education.120 
Women’s rights in relation to housing, social security, 
food and water are also increasingly gaining the atten-
tion of the committees and special mandate holders. 
Many of the CESCR general comments make specific 
reference to gender equality and women’s issues in 
relation to the particular right concerned (CESCR 1997, 
para 10; 2000, paras. 20 and 21; 2003, para 16; 2006, 
para 13; 2007, para 32). The rights of women workers in 
120 Discussed above in section 2.3.
both the formal and informal sectors are of ongoing 
concern to the HRC, CESCR, CEDAW Committee and 
CERD Committee.121 Feminist campaigning and sus-
tained advocacy on issues of violence against women 
and reproductive rights has led to regular and strong 
statements by the various committees on these is-
sues. The consistent approach by the committees to 
these core areas reflects a deepening understanding 
of the complex nature of gender inequality and its 
many manifestations in different countries of the 
world. Substantive equality requires close attention 
to context as a full picture of the impact of inequal-
ity is often necessary to highlight the hidden nature 
of disadvantage. The UN treaty body system, with 
its detailed study of country reports and individual 
complaints as well as the country visits of special 
mandate holders, is well suited to this type of inquiry. 
In many instances the committees – and the CEDAW 
Committee in particular – are playing a valuable role 
in exposing public/private divisions that relegate 
women to a subordinate status in every country of 
the world. 
There are, however, some areas where treaties and 
their interpretive bodies could be delving more deeply 
into forms of gender inequality and providing clearer 
direction to countries on their substantive equality 
obligations. The above analysis has attempted to sys-
tematize the responses of the international human 
rights institutions according to a framework that re-
flects the demands of substantive equality. However, 
the bodies themselves rarely reflect on or articulate 
the principles driving their responses. We have shown 
that these principles are nascent and can be made 
explicit. But, without a conscious attempt to articu-
late and develop these principles, there will always 
be gaps and inconsistencies and the potential to con-
tinually evolve will remain unfulfilled. Three areas of 
particularly weakness are highlighted here. The first is 
a content issue – the failure to adequately acknowl-
edge or address women’s unpaid work. The second is 
121  Discussed above in section 2.1.
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an issue of scope and co-ordination – the capacity of 
the treaty system to develop systemic responses to 
global and national macroeconomic concerns relating 
to women’s rights. And the third is an issue of appli-
cation and remedy – the extent to which the treaty 
bodies are applying substantive equality to require 
‘levelling up’ in situations where gender inequal-
ity is present so as to achieve more transformative 
outcomes. 
(a) Unpaid work
The most glaring content gap in the treaty bodies’ ap-
proach to gender equality is in the area of women’s 
unpaid work, particularly in relation to household 
reproduction and care. While the preamble to CEDAW 
talks about the ‘sharing of responsibility between 
men and women and society as a whole’ this is not 
operationalized in the body of the Convention other 
than in the reference to support for parents in the 
workplace. In fact, these references reinforce the idea 
of work as being paid work outside of the home. As 
discussed above, the CEDAW Committee has tried 
to address this gap in the Convention in two general 
recommendations.122 The first deals with women’s un-
paid work in family enterprises (CEDAW Committee 
1991a). The second focuses on measuring and valu-
ing women’s unremunerated domestic activities in 
national accounts (CEDAW Committee 1991b), but it 
fails to consider mechanisms to address the imbal-
ance between women and men in the household 
or to remunerate women for such work. While this 
recommendation was a progressive attempt to ‘count’ 
women’s unpaid work in the home, it failed to take the 
more radical leap in the direction of social restructur-
ing that would address this underlying and pervasive 
global phenomenon. Moreover, the CESCR, in two 
general comments on the right to work (2006) and 
the right to social security (2007), fails to use these 
statements as an opportunity to call for the recogni-
tion and remuneration of women’s unpaid work. The 
ILO’s Social Protection Floor Recommendation also 
fails to recognize women’s unpaid work – it sees social 
security as a worker’s right rather than a human right 
(Darooka 2012). 
122  Ibid.
Some of the special rapporteurs have identified the 
inequality inherent in women’s unpaid work and 
their responsibilities for household reproduction and 
care. The recent report by the Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty on unpaid care work is a notable 
contribution (UN General Assembly 2013). She notes 
that: ‘Even human rights advocates and monitoring 
bodies have so far paid little sustained attention to 
the human rights implications of unpaid care work. 
This is highly problematic, given that care not only 
contributes to well-being, social development and 
economic growth but also has an enormous impact 
on the enjoyment of human rights of both caregivers 
and care receivers’ (ibid., para. 4). Thus, greater efforts 
are needed within the treaty body system to shift 
male-oriented definitions of work and to require fun-
damental restructuring of work and care. 
(b) Macroeconomic analysis
A focus on the scope of the treaty system’s mandate 
and purview reveals some limitations in its capacity to 
pronounce on the macroeconomic forces at State and 
international level that impact on gender inequality. 
The committees are to some extent constrained by 
their functions of interrogating rights compliance 
within specific countries. This means that they may 
not always be able to adduce patterns at regional 
or global levels where, for example, multinational 
companies are playing a negative role in relation to 
acquisition of land, harm to the environment or poor 
employment practices that have particularly harsh 
impacts on women in the affected countries. The 
general recommendations/comments are one way in 
which the committees can address this gap and there 
have been some important statements on States’ 
international obligations of cooperation and assis-
tance, although these are not specifically ‘gendered’ 
(for example, CESCR 2007, paras. 52–58). The commit-
tees do, however, provide some valuable insights in 
their concluding observations on the impact of eco-
nomic measures. For example, the CEDAW Committee 
has recently found that austerity measures and 
cuts to services are having a negative impact on 
women (particularly older women and women with 
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disabilities) in the United Kingdom.123 The Committee 
has recommended that ‘spending Reviews (should) 
continuously focus on measuring and balancing the 
impact of austerity measures on women’s rights’. The 
special mandate holders tend to be better placed to 
analyse the systemic impact of macroeconomic policy. 
As mentioned, the independent expert on the effects 
of foreign debt has made a number of important 
statements linking gender inequality to debt and 
policy conditionality as well as austerity.124 Similarly, 
the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty has re-
minded States of their obligations regarding gender 
equality in response to economic crisis.125 The Special 
Rapporteur on the right to food has recommended 
gender-sensitive agricultural policies, including those 
relating to land and finance (HRC 2012a, paras. 30–36). 
A more comprehensive approach might be achieved 
through joint inquiries and general recommenda-
tions/comments developed by multiple committees 
such as the CEDAW Committee, the CESCR and the 
Committee for the Migrant Workers Convention on 
specific themes such as the rights of women mi-
grant workers.126 The committees could also consider 
developing a set of reporting guidelines for States 
to more fully report on the impact of their macro-
economic policies on women within their countries 
and beyond their borders. The Maastricht Principles 
on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, drawn up 
by a group of independent human rights experts, 
might be of assistance to the committees in defin-
ing the global responsibilities of States in the area of 
economic and social rights.127 These principles extend 
123 CEDAW Committee. 2013. “Concluding Observations United 
Kingdom Seventh Periodic Report.” CEDAW/C/GBR/CO/7, 
paras 20–21.
124  Discussed above in section 2.1.
125  Ibid.
126  Note that the CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) are working on a joint general recom-
mendation on harmful practices, see CEDAW Committee. 2011. 
“Joint CEDAW-CRC General Recommendation/Comment on 
Harmful Practices.”
127 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of 
States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(29 February 2012), Maastricht Centre for Human Rights, 
Maastricht University.
to the role of non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations that operate under the direction or the 
control of States.128 Principles of non-discrimination 
and equality, including gender equality, inform the ob-
ligations of States to fulfil social and economic rights 
extraterritorially.129  
(c) Remedies: levelling up
The treaty bodies do not always take full advantage of 
the transformative potential of substantive equality 
in requiring States to introduce measures that target 
women’s disadvantage by providing special access 
to benefits and services that are needed to support 
women to participate fully in society. As mentioned, 
the Special Rapporteur on water has noted that ‘while 
universality is about ensuring access for all, equality 
is about “levelling up” or working towards improving 
the quality and levels of service of groups that lag 
behind’.130 ‘Levelling up’ is about bringing the disad-
vantaged up to the level of those who are better off 
to achieve uniformity rather than lowering the level 
of those with more. While it is an important concept, 
it has not been used widely by the treaty bodies. For 
example, although as we have seen much emphasis 
is placed on the importance of equal pay for work 
of equal value for women and men, it is rarely made 
explicit that women’s pay should be increased to that 
of men. 
A particularly challenging issue has been that of 
‘protective legislation’, or measures that prohibit 
the employment of women in certain jobs that 
are thought to pose a specific danger to them. ILO 
Conventions have prohibited night-work for women 
since 1919 (ILO 1919) and underground work in mines 
for women since 1935 (ILO 1935). In recent decades, 
there has been strong opposition to such restrictions 
on the grounds that they breach the equality prin-
ciple. However, this has led to two quite contradictory 
responses. The UK Government, with few exceptions, 
128  Ibid., para. 12.
129  Ibid., para. 32(c).
130   Discussed above in section 1.8. The CEDAW Committee 
has encouraged Austria to ensure ‘levelling up’ measures 
are included in its anti-discrimination legislation: CEDAW 
Committee, Austria, op. cit., paras 10–11.
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simply repealed the protective legislation, thereby 
withdrawing protection from women without achiev-
ing any corresponding benefits for either women or 
men. By contrast, the European Commission declared 
specifically that ‘equality should not be made the oc-
casion for a dis-improvement of working conditions 
for one sex’ (European Commission 1987).131 The ILO 
adopted a new convention on night work in 1990 that 
applies to both women and men. Recognizing that 
the question of night-work affects all workers, both in 
respect of their own health and their family obliga-
tions, the Convention specifies that special measures 
should be taken to include minimum protection for 
night-workers’ health and to assist them to meet fam-
ily and social responsibilities (ILO 1990). 
While the idea of ‘levelling up’ may imply a process of 
changing unequal conditions over time, this should 
not mean that States have space to avoid imple-
menting such measures immediately. Equality and 
non-discrimination rights in the international treaties 
require immediate realization. This is a stronger stan-
dard than applies to the social and economic rights in 
ICESCR that must be progressively realized by States 
(to the maximum of their available resources). Thus, 
where social and economic provision is occurring un-
evenly in a country and women are disproportionately 
disadvantaged in relation to such provision, the State 
is required to immediately provide special access to 
women (or certain groups of women facing multiple 
or intersectional disadvantage). Treaty bodies should 
be more forceful in requiring States to develop pro-
grammes to address women’s disadvantaged access 
to housing, health services, work and basic services 
(to name but a few of the areas of inequality in many 
countries). 
2.6	
The possibilities and limits of human rights for gender equality
International human rights law – and in particular 
CEDAW and the work of the CEDAW Committee – has 
led to many tangible and positive changes around 
women’s rights in the laws and policies of countries 
around the world. This has often been due to the 
determination of NGOs in using concluding observa-
tions to push their governments to introduce reforms 
in countries such as Fiji, India, Kyrgyzstan Morocco, 
Nepal and Thailand (Byrnes 2013: 60–61). While this 
valuable impact is acknowledged, it is also important 
to note the ways in which women’s human rights fail 
to penetrate the terrible and unfair circumstances of 
millions of the world’s women and girls. First, there 
are a number of States that refuse to ratify human 
rights treaties. Second, even where they do, some 
enter reservations that question their commitment to 
the treaties and reduce their accountability on impor-
tant women’s rights. Third, while submitting to the 
treaty committees, some States fail to report or take 
unconscionably long to do so. Fourth, even where they 
do report, some ignore committee recommendations, 
131 See further Fredman 1997, pp. 304–308.
implement them in a half-hearted way or introduce 
laws without the resources to ensure their proper 
implementation.132 Fifth, where States undertake re-
forms to laws and policies, these do not always filter 
down to the intended beneficiaries. Women often 
lack access to the means to enforce laws due to lack 
of resources, ignorance, illiteracy and numerous other 
such barriers. Sixth, committee scrutiny and recom-
mendations and subsequent legal changes do not 
always manage to confront the deeply embedded 
social, economic and cultural structures that enable 
gender inequalities and harms. 
This last point relates to scepticism about the capac-
ity of law in general and human rights in particular 
to produce fundamental transformation of society.133 
Some feminist writers have suggested that wom-
en’s rights work within the human rights system 
132  For some suggestions to improve the effectiveness of the 
CEDAW Committee in enforcement, see Farha 2008, p. 568.
133  See, for example, Kennedy 2002; Brown 2004. For a critical 
feminist analysis of international human rights law see 
Engle 2005; MacKinnon 2006, pp. 1–14.
Gender Equality 
and Human Rights 38
sometimes fails to unsettle underlying gender stereo-
types within human rights law or even perpetuates 
these (Otto 2005; Kapur 2002).
The reality is that human rights often fail to reach 
those for whom they are intended. We know that de-
spite 50 years of the International ‘Bill of Rights’ and 
30 years of CEDAW, women still earn less than men 
in every society of the world, violence against women 
is similarly prevalent in every country and women 
and girls fare poorly on many other indicators such as 
health and education (Otto 2010: 346). Responses to 
these challenges entail a combination of politics from 
within the human rights system and framework and 
politics outside of it. 
Feminists engage within the human rights system 
in a range of ways: International women’s NGOs and 
networks campaign and lobby UN bodies in develop-
ing general comments/recommendations and other 
such position statements. National NGOs representing 
different groups of women, sometimes in coalition, 
prepare alternative or ‘shadow’ reports when their 
governments report to UN committees. These shadow 
reports often provide critical information and analysis 
to counter their governments’ versions. They enhance 
accountability internationally but also nationally where 
the reporting process enables domestic conversations 
between civil society advocates and government of-
ficials. NGO consultations with community-based 
women in preparing shadow reports provide an oppor-
tunity to educate women on human rights and ensure 
their voices are heard at national and international 
levels. In addition, NGOs provide support to individuals 
who wish to raise complaints under optional protocol 
mechanisms. The special rapporteurs also rely on local 
groupings within countries to point to on-the-ground 
problems. The Paris Principles (1993) that create in-
ternational standards for National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs) have led to the establishment 
or strengthening of many such bodies in countries 
around the globe. NHRIs can, and often do, play an 
important role in holding national governments to ac-
count on human rights issues. Women’s groups at local 
level engage with these bodies to address domestic 
human rights violations. Such groups also challenge 
their governments to introduce laws consistent with 
and enabling of human rights. Many countries have 
adopted constitutional rights and legislation based 
on international human rights that provide a basis for 
recourse to courts and political structures by women’s 
groups and individuals within countries. These and 
other mechanisms ensure that rights have meaning 
for women’s lives and are an important component 
of strategies used by the women’s movement around 
the world.  
A broader politics outside of the human rights system 
is clearly essential for the women’s movement. While 
human rights treaty processes often focus on indi-
vidual state compliance, transnational feminists are 
able to contest global politics outside of what Nancy 
Fraser describes as the ‘state-territorial frame’ (Fraser 
2008: 112). International activism that exposes the 
gender inequalities produced by global economic and 
political forces can support a more integrated focus 
on the national and international within the human 
rights treaty system. 
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3.	
USING THE EQUALITY 
FRAMEWORK TO 
EVALUATE SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND 
PROVISION
The above analysis illustrates that the four-dimensional framework of substantive gender 
equality set out in the first part of this paper is implicitly followed in the recent observations 
and recommendations of the human rights treaty bodies and special procedures mandate 
holders. These groups and individuals routinely locate their work on gender equality within the 
four dimensions set out above, even if this is not always explicitly stated. This is an encourag-
ing trend as it reflects a deep understanding within the human rights system of the need for 
a sophisticated approach to equality to achieve far-reaching change by challenging complex 
inequalities.
This last part of the report reflects on the ways in 
which the four-dimensional approach to equality 
can be used as a tool to evaluate social and economic 
policies and their impact on women. This type of 
evaluation can provide direction, within a human 
rights-based approach to law, policy and develop-
ment, for the reformulation of social programmes 
that contribute to gendered transformation. The ap-
plication of the equality approach will focus, by way 
of example, on social security programmes in two 
different contexts and consider whether these are 
advancing gender equality and how they might be 
better aligned to substantive equality goals.
The current interest in introducing or expanding so-
cial security in many parts of the developing world is 
a welcome step in the fight against poverty and in the 
realization of human rights. At the same time, some 
developed countries are reducing social security pro-
grammes as part of ‘austerity’ approaches to financial 
challenges facing their economies, or in some cases, 
as part of an older process of scaling back welfare 
programmes for a combination of financial and 
ideological reasons. In both developed and developing 
contexts, social security programmes are increas-
ingly taking the form of ‘conditional cash transfer’ 
programmes. These programmes see social security 
as a means of linking social policy objectives, such as 
increasing school and clinic attendance, to poverty 
reduction. This is done by imposing conditions, usually 
on mothers, to take their children to school or health 
clinics in order to qualify for social security payments. 
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As Aber and Rawlings put it: ‘The more traditional view 
of social assistance (transfers as a handout in times of 
need to alleviate poverty) has begun to evolve into a 
new view of social assistance as a dynamic where pro-
tection is complemented by dynamic, tailored support 
to develop the human capital needed to move out of 
poverty. The use of incentives to affect individual in-
vestments, spur effective practices among providers, 
and leverage mobility out of poverty are increasingly 
being applied within this new paradigm’ (2011: 17). 
These developments require examination within 
a rights framework to determine whether States 
are realizing the human right to social security and 
whether this right is being provided equality to 
women and men, as demanded by international hu-
man rights law. To do so, the following section uses 
the four-dimensional equality approach to evaluate 
(1) conditional social assistance programmes and (2) 
cutbacks to existing social security programmes from 
the perspective of substantive equality for women. 
Before beginning this examination, the terminol-
ogy used here is briefly discussed. ‘Social security’ as 
a human right is defined as: all benefits, whether in 
cash or in kind, provided to protect against ‘(a) lack 
of work-related income caused by sickness, disability, 
maternity, employment injury, unemployment, old 
age, or death of a family member; (b) unaffordable ac-
cess to health care; and, (c) insufficient family support, 
particularly for children and adult dependents’ (CESCR 
2007, para 2). Social security takes a range of forms 
including social insurance (generally involving contri-
butions by individuals, employers and sometimes the 
state) and social assistance, usually provided by the 
state from tax revenue to certain categories of people, 
often based on need. Transfers may take the form of 
cash or some other benefit or may be provided as tax 
credits. Cash transfers may be provided uncondition-
ally to all eligible groups or on the basis of certain 
conditions being met by the recipients. As mentioned, 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have increased in 
popularity in many developing countries. CCTs differ 
from public works programmes where governments 
promise a wage in return for labour provided by those 
involved in the programme. In CCTs conditions may 
involve attendance at clinics, the delivering of children 
to schools, participation in courses and so on. Lastly, 
social protection should be distinguished from social 
security since both terms are used in the development 
and human rights literature, often interchangeably. 
For the purpose of this discussion, social protection 
is given the meaning provided by the ILO (2012) in its 
recommendation for social protection floors: “nation-
ally defined sets of basic social security guarantees 
which secure protection aimed at preventing or al-
leviating poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion”. 
Ensuring social protection floors requires a basic level 
of social security as well as other basic services such 
as education to be provided in countries that do not 
yet have minimum levels. The ILO recommends that, 
at the same time, other countries should extend exist-
ing social security provision at higher levels to a wider 
number of people.   
3.1	
Conditionalities
Social security benefits in advanced welfare states 
have generally had gendered consequences. 
Contributions-based benefits privilege those who 
can work continuously and full-time throughout 
their working life in the formal sector. Yet women 
have remained primarily responsible for childcare and 
therefore tend to have an intermittent relationship 
with the labour market or to predominate in the in-
formal labour market. The result is that women have 
been consistently disadvantaged in their ability to 
access contributions-based social welfare benefits or 
social insurance. This is true too for means-tested ben-
efits. In particular, means testing based on household 
income ignores the fact that women may not have 
equal access to resources within the family (Fredman 
1997; HRC 2009).
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In recent years, the perception of women as secondary 
citizens in relation to welfare rights appears to have 
reversed. Instead, it is women who are the focus of 
many modern social welfare programmes. Because 
the evidence shows that women are likely to prioritize 
their children’s welfare in using available resources, 
they are now seen as the main vehicle for poverty 
alleviation and therefore the main recipients of wel-
fare rights (Fiszbein and Schady 2011: 4). Recent CCTs 
in many parts of the world including Latin America, 
Mexico, Africa, Asia – and even the city of New York 
– require mothers to bring children to clinics, ensure 
school attendance and attend workshops on nutrition 
and other topics as a condition for receipt of benefits. 
Older CCTs such as workfare programmes found in 
North America, Australia, the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere require mothers to enter the workforce or 
engage in retraining as a condition for receiving as-
sistance. Although CCTs appear to have some positive 
impacts on poverty, feminist critiques of CCTs suggest 
that these programmes add to women’s burdens 
while failing to challenge the existing inequalities 
that require women to perform the bulk of household 
labour and care work (Chant 2008; Molyneux 2006).134 
States are required to realize the right to social secu-
rity equally for women and men in terms of article 3 of 
ICESCR. This means that social security measures must 
be evaluated both in terms of their general compli-
ance with human rights and in terms of their specific 
compliance with gender equality guarantees in in-
ternational human rights law. The four-dimensional 
equality framework enables us to evaluate particular 
CCT programmes from the perspective of gender 
equality and to propose appropriate modifications.135 
134  It should be noted that there is a wide-ranging and nuanced 
debate on the gender impact of CCTs that cannot be con-
sidered in detail here. For a recent summary of this debate 
and the evidence, as well as some interesting conclusions 
see: Holmes and Jones 2013, Chapter 3. The authors develop 
a gender-based ‘transformative social protection framework’ 
for examining social protection. In a similar vein, see: Waring 
et al. 2013. The authors also take a gendered approach to 
transformative social protection but place greater stress on 
the centrality of human rights in achieving this end. 
135  This section is drawn from Fredman 2013b.
(a) Redressing disadvantage
Evaluating programmes on this dimension requires 
us to examine not just generalized distributive gains 
but also the particular redistributive issues that affect 
women, such as the distribution of power within the 
family and the distribution of time. Both require care-
ful evaluation. The World Bank argues that ‘attaching 
strings to the transfers by mandating specific human 
capital investments could strengthen the mother’s 
bargaining position and reinforce her ability to shift 
household spending and time allocation decisions’ 
(Fiszbein and Schady 2011: 59). However, there is also 
evidence suggesting that if women bring more re-
sources into the family, men withhold more of their 
own resources for personal consumption. Similarly, 
CCTs might worsen time poverty, an aspect of poverty 
that is particularly gendered. A study by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of 22 
countries in both the developed and developing world 
found that women work more hours overall than 
men, and that for women, unpaid reproductive labour 
accounted for 66 per cent of their work, compared to 
24–34 per cent of that of men (Chant 2008: 179, citing 
Rodenberg 2004). This is particularly marked among 
low income groups: ‘. . . the poorer the household, 
the longer women work’ (ibid.). Given the extensive 
demands on women’s existing time, conditions may 
well increase women’s disadvantage by intensifying 
their burdens. CCTs often require women to spend 
time meeting programme conditions when they are 
already overstretched in terms of both paid work 
and household responsibilities. Where conditions are 
particularly unyielding, this can lead to loss of social 
security benefits for women. 
Clearly too, the amount of the cash transfer, and its net 
value to the woman once time burdens are accounted 
for, would make a difference to its effect. It is there-
fore important that claims to redress gender-based 
disadvantage through making mothers the recipients 
of cash grants should be supported by clear evidence 
that the transfer is indeed empowering. On the other 
hand, the imposition of conditions is by its nature 
disempowering. Empowerment in this context should 
include the enhancement of agency, based on improv-
ing the range of genuinely feasible choices open to 
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women. Conditions could only empower women in 
this sense if they enabled her achieve her own pur-
poses in the face of resistance from her family. There 
is no evidence that this is how they function: instead, 
the evidence points, as we have seen, to limitations on 
choice and agency. Indeed, research seems to suggest 
that if empowerment of women is indeed the aim, it 
is far better achieved by giving resources to women 
without conditions. Thus research by Patel et al. into 
the Child Support Grant in South Africa, which until 
very recently was unconditional, found that giving 
women resources enhanced their power and control 
over household decision-making in financial matters 
and general household spending on child well-being 
(Patel et al. 2012). In evaluating CCT programmes, 
therefore, it is important to consider whether the cash 
transfer could achieve the same objectives without 
attaching onerous conditions. 
(b) Redressing stigma, stereotyping and 
prejudice
CCTs are problematic in that they are based on the 
central premise that it is mothers who are the primary 
child-carers and should therefore be required to deliv-
er the conditions relating to child health or education. 
Moreover, they assume that, without conditions, some 
mothers will not take rational steps to enhance their 
family’s well being (Bradshaw 2008: 198–199). In addi-
tion, enforcement of conditions can involve punitive 
measures and close surveillance and monitoring that 
can be harmful to women’s dignity and autonomy. 
Conversely, CCTs may serve to marginalize fathers 
since the programmes assume that men will not be 
committed to addressing the developmental needs of 
their families. 
(c) Transformation
CCTs, by assuming that mothers are better suited to 
take responsibility for their children’s welfare, are in-
herently non-transformative. Instead of finding ways 
of involving men in greater responsibility for their 
families, they reinforce existing gender inequalities 
in the division of labour in the household and society. 
CCTs also divert attention from the need to address the 
structural constraints facing women and men living in 
poverty. The real reasons for failure to attend school or 
health clinics need not be tackled, and yet these may 
be centrally related to gender disadvantage. For ex-
ample, girls may not attend school because of safety 
concerns. More generally, as Sepúlveda and Nyst have 
pointed out, conditionalities might reinforce poor 
service provision, in that users are unable to opt out 
or otherwise exercise pressure for change but instead 
are dependent on service providers to sign off on their 
eligibility for receiving grants.136 A transformative ap-
proach would focus on mechanisms to address basic 
needs rather than transferring the blame for poverty 
onto the misbehaviour of welfare recipients. While 
unconditional cash transfers may be transformative 
in lifting women out of the structural conditions of 
disadvantage that prevent them from fully engaging 
in the workforce and society, the conditions included 
in CCTs do not seem to be helpful in achieving change.
(d) Participation
Unconditional social assistance gives women choice 
and agency in determining what they and their house-
holds need. Conversely, conditions seem to remove 
women’s autonomy by requiring them to behave in 
defined ways or lose their benefits. In addition, poor 
women are rarely adequately involved in determining 
the types of social security programmes that might 
best meet their needs. 
It is important to note that CCTs may impact most 
harshly on marginalized women within the broader 
group of poor women at which they are aimed. Thus, for 
example, indigenous women may have less opportunity 
to meet the conditions imposed in transfer programmes 
because of their geographical location further from 
services or because of racial or other discriminatory at-
titudes of officials administering such programmes. 
Magalena Sepulveda, the independent expert on 
human rights and extreme poverty (writing with 
Carly Nyst) has stressed that human rights are not 
conditional and should be provided as entitlements 
without demanding certain behaviours in exchange 
(Sepúlveda and Nyst 2012: 500). She has recommended 
that ‘protections must be put in place to ensure that 
136  Sepúlveda and Nyst 2012: 48-52. 
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conditionalities do not create an unnecessary burden 
on women, expose them to abuse, or perpetuate tradi-
tional gender stereotypes within recipient households’ 
(ibid.). Cash transfers must also take care to redress 
specific gender disadvantage. She has also warned 
against conditions in cash transfer programmes that 
place unfair burdens on women (HRC 2009, para. 25; 
UN General Assembly 2010, para. 60). She recommends 
that States should assess whether such programmes 
affect women’s decision-making authority and par-
ticipation, and whether they perpetuate gender-biased 
stereotyped roles for men and women.
Substantive equality is most likely to be achieved not by 
imposing conditions on women but by ensuring that 
poverty is addressed through the provision of good 
quality services and in a manner that challenges 
unequal gender relations. The CCT example dem-
onstrates the importance of the principle of 
international human rights law that rights are uni-
versal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.137 
Thus, it is not enough to realize one type of right (such 
as social security) without also providing other rights 
(such as health, education and work). The set of uni-
versal human rights is a holistic package to ensure a 
life of dignity for all people. These rights need to be 
understood and shaped according to the dimensions 
of substantive gender equality in order to ensure that 
women are equally able to benefit from all of the hu-
man rights in the international laws.
3.2	
Austerity cutbacks
While137 women in developing countries have been the 
focus of CCT programmes, women in many developed 
countries have experienced the removal of some of the 
social security measures on which they had previously 
relied. Following the global financial crisis, a number 
of advanced economies have looked at ways of tight-
ening budgets to reduce debt. Social programmes 
have faced cuts in areas that governments have 
identified as no longer necessary, as wasteful or as too 
expensive relative to other programmes that are more 
important. These are often complex decisions that 
involve weighing up social need, political reaction and 
economic advantage. Sometimes missing from the 
analysis are the human rights implications of particu-
lar decisions on a range of affected groups. Women 
are often among those most affected by such cuts 
because of their disproportionately greater poverty 
and disadvantage, but this is not always visible with-
out careful unpacking of the impact of the measures 
based on appropriate evidence.138 
137 World Conference on Human Rights. 1993. Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), 25 June 1993, 
A/CONF.157/23, Part 1, para 5.
138  For a discussion of the impact of austerity measures on 
women in developed countries see: Lahey and de Villota 2013; 
Elson 2012. For a consideration of the problems of austerity 
for women in developing countries see: Ortiz 2013.
A human rights-based approach requires State 
parties to test new laws and policies against the 
obligations to which they are bound in terms of in-
ternational human rights law. According to article 2 
of the ICESCR, State parties must take steps to the 
maximum of their available resources to progres-
sively realize the social and economic rights in the 
Covenant. (It is important to note, however, that the 
obligations to ensure that women and men benefit 
equally from rights and that the rights are exercised 
without discrimination have immediate effect.) 
Article 4 states that the rights in the Covenant may 
only be limited in so far as this is compatible with 
the nature of the rights and only for the purpose 
of promoting the ‘general welfare in a democratic 
society’. These two articles place constraints on the 
extent to which existing rights can be removed by a 
State party. Among such Covenant rights is the right 
to social security found in article 9.139
The CESCR explains in General Comment no. 19 on 
the right to social security that improper removal 
of rights, known as retrogressive measures, are not 
permissible unless the State party can show that it 
139  The right to social security is also found in other human 
rights treaties including CEDAW, CERD, CRPD, CRC and 
International Covenant on the Rights of Migrant Workers.
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has carefully considered the alternatives and that the 
measures are justifiable in relation to all the rights in 
the Covenant in the context of the State party’s full 
use of its resources. In order to decide if a measure 
is justified the Committee looks at whether (CESCR 
2007, para. 42):
(a) there was reasonable justification for the action; 
(b) alternatives were comprehensively examined; 
(c) there was genuine participation of affected groups 
in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; 
(d) the measures were directly or indirectly 
discriminatory; 
(e) the measures will have a sustained impact on the 
realization of the right to social security, an unrea-
sonable impact on acquired social security rights or 
whether an individual or group is deprived of access 
to the minimum essential level of social security; and 
(f) there was an independent review of the measures 
at the national level.
As can be seen from this list, discrimination is a 
component of the enquiry. Participation, a dimen-
sion of the substantive equality framework, is also a 
consideration. In assessing whether a social security 
cutback is permissible, the four-dimensional substan-
tive equality approach assists in evaluating any policy 
in relation to its impact on women and the enjoyment 
of their rights following the introduction of the policy. 
(a) Redressing disadvantage
Any removal or reduction of a payment for single 
parents of young children requires consideration 
of whether disadvantage was worsened or allevi-
ated (Goldblatt 2013). In all likelihood, unless it was 
replaced with an alternative form of income support, 
the affected parents would be harshly affected. If 
the nature of the group affected was analysed more 
closely, it might become clear that the majority was 
made up of women. Further analysis might show 
that single mothers are one of the most economically 
vulnerable groups in society.140 From an intersectional 
perspective, indigenous women, migrants or other 
minority groups might be overrepresented in the 
single mother group.
(b) Redressing stigma, prejudice, stereotyping 
and violence
This dimension requires an analysis of the single 
mother group to find whether loss of the social secu-
rity benefit would deepen the discrimination faced by 
this group, which already faces stigma and stereotyp-
ing. For example, by losing benefits, single mothers 
might be forced to ask family and friends to house 
or support them and their children or they might be 
forced to live on the street. This could result in an im-
pairment of their dignity or place them in dangerous 
situations, exposed to violence and abuse. 
(c) Transformation
The removal of a payment to single parents might 
also make it harder for young mothers to escape their 
vulnerability and access the same opportunities as 
young men or couples. The transformative dimen-
sion of the equality framework encourages a deeper 
understanding of the impact of the loss of this social 
assistance measure. The original objective of the pay-
ment may have been seen as a special measure to 
address the structural disadvantages facing single 
parents (usually mothers) in accessing education and 
work opportunities and to make childcare more af-
fordable. Even if this was not the objective of such a 
payment, but rather it was seen as a means of provid-
ing for children in the poorest households (often single 
parent households), its indirect effect may have been 
to assist this very disadvantaged group. Removing the 
payment might undermine efforts to address gender 
inequalities in this section of the society.  
(d) Participation 
An examination of the policy in terms of the par-
ticipative dimension would look at the impact of the 
payment cut on the major group affected – single 
mothers. The payment, even if it was small, may have 
enabled women to fund some childcare and, as a 
140 Elson 2012 shows that cuts in the UK affected lone parents, 
most of whom are women, the hardest (p. 186).
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result, allowed them to work, pursue their educa-
tion, participate in their communities and have some 
time for rest, leisure or social contact. Without this 
state support, the group’s capacity to participate 
equally would be limited. The lack of participation of 
single parents in considering the proposed cuts and 
alternatives to them would contribute to the view 
 
that the measure was retrogressive (as judged by 
the Committee’s listed criteria). The extent to which 
mothers in the affected group were able to participate 
would need to be examined to ensure that they were 
equally able, alongside fathers, to have their voices 
heard. The possibilities for equal participation by 
particularly vulnerable or marginal sub-groups within 
the single mother group, such as migrant women or 
women belonging to a particular race group, would 
need to be assessed to ensure that there were full and 
equal opportunities for participation by women fac-
ing intersectional discrimination.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has drawn on the evolving understandings 
of equality in order to articulate a clear standard by 
which to evaluate social and economic policies and 
thereby to ‘make the economy work for women’. It 
aims to show that in the context of women, these un-
derstandings are best understood as an elaboration 
of the principle of substantive equality along four di-
mensions: the redistributive dimension, which aims to 
redress women’s specifically gendered disadvantage; 
the recognition dimension, which aims to address 
stigma, prejudice, humiliation and violence; the trans-
formative dimension, which aims to reconstruct basic 
institutional features that function as obstacles to 
women; and the participative dimension, which aims 
to enhance women’s voice and social inclusion. 
We have aimed to show two things. First, we have 
demonstrated that these dimensions are already 
implicit in the ways in which the various treaty bodies 
evaluate the extent to which States are in compli-
ance with their treaty obligations not to discriminate 
against women. Second, by applying the framework to 
two of the most contested issues within social secu-
rity policy, we have shown that the four-dimensional 
understanding of substantive gendered equality pro-
vides a valuable evaluative tool for assessing social and 
economic policies from the perspective of substantive 
gender equality and for pointing towards fashioning 
alternatives that score better against these criteria. 
By making the implicit understandings of substantive 
equality explicit and by fully articulating the growing 
consensus at international level on an understanding 
of substantive equality that reflects the four dimen-
sions set out above, the extent to which policies can 
be shaped to address the specific challenges of gen-
dered inequality can be considerably enhanced.  
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ANNEX 1. 
References to Substantive Equality in  
Individual Complaints Procedure 
Treaty 
Body
Decision Aspect of Substantive Equality Outcome
HRC Miroslav Lain and 
Eva Klain v Czech 
Republic CCPR/
C/103/D/1847/2008
The Committee reiterates its jurisprudence that not all differentiation 
in treatment can be deemed to be discriminatory under article 26. A 
differentiation which is compatible with the provisions of the Covenant and 
is based on objective and reasonable grounds does not amount to prohibited 
discrimination within the meaning of article 26.11.
Successful 
HRC VDA v Argentine 
Republic CCPR/
C/101/D/1608/2007
The Committee takes note of the author’s allegations to the effect that, be-
cause it lacked the mechanisms that would have enabled L.M.R. to undergo 
a termination of pregnancy, the State party is responsible…For these reasons, 
the Committee considers that the author did not have access to an effective 
remedy and the facts described constitute a violation of article 2, paragraph 3 
in relation to articles 3, 7 and 17 of the Covenant.
Successful
HCR Jacobs v Belgium 
CCPR/C/81/D/943/2000
In the first place, the Committee notes that the gender requirement 
was introduced by Parliament under the terms of the Act of 20 
July 1990 on the promotion of a balance between men and women 
on advisory bodies. The aim in this case is to increase the representation 
of and participation by women in the various advisory bodies in view of the 
very low numbers of women found there. On this point, the Committee finds 
the author’s assertion that the insufficient number of female applicants 
in response to the first call proves there is no inequality between men and 
women to be unpersuasive in the present case; such a situation may, on the 
contrary, reveal a need to encourage women to apply for public service on 
bodies.
Successful
HRC Derksen v The 
Netherlands 
CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001
Not Using SE analysis: Taking into account that the past practice of 
distinguishing between married and unmarried couples did not constitute 
prohibited discrimination, the Committee is of the opinion that the State party 
was under no obligation to make the amendment retroactive (in legislation 
which extends benefits to unmarried couples).
Not successful 
HRC Joslin v New Zealand 
CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999
Not Using SE analysis: Use of the term ‘men and women’, rather than the 
general terms used elsewhere in Part III of the Covenant, has been consis-
tently and uniformly understood as indicating that the treaty obligation of 
States parties stemming from article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is to 
recognize as marriage only the union between a man and a woman wishing 
to marry each other. 8.3 In light of the scope of the right to marry under 
article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, the Committee cannot find that by 
mere refusal to provide for marriage between homosexual couples, the State 
party has violated the rights of the authors.
Unsuccessful
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Treaty 
Body
Decision Aspect of Substantive Equality Outcome
HRC Muller and Engelhard v 
Namibia CCPR/
C/74/D/919/2000
In view of the importance of the principle of equality between men and 
women, the argument of a long-standing tradition cannot be maintained 
as a general justification for different treatment of men and women, which 
is contrary to the Covenant. To subject the possibility of choosing the wife’s 
surname as family name to stricter and much more cumbersome conditions 
than the alternative (choice of husband’s surname) cannot be judged to be 
reasonable; at any rate the reason for the distinction has no sufficient impor-
tance in order to outweigh the generally excluded gender-based approach.
Successful
HRC Vos v The Netherlands 
CCPR/C/66/D/786/1997
Application of FE (Formal Equality): The issue before the Committee is 
whether Mr. Vos is a victim of a violation of article 26, because the calculation 
of the incorporation of his general pension into his ABP pension is different 
for him as a married man than for married women, as a consequence of 
which he receives less pension than a married woman…The State party 
has argued that no discrimination has occurred since at the time when the 
author became entitled to a pension, married women and married men 
were not in a comparable position with regard to the general pension… The 
pension paid to the author as a married male former civil servant whose 
pension accrued before 1985 is lower than the pension paid to a married 
female former civil servant whose pension accrued at the same date. In the 
Committee’s view this amounts to a violation of article 26 of the Covenant.
Successful
HRC Pauger v Austria 
CCPR/C/65/D/716/1996
Application of FE: The lump-sum payment, consisting of 70 monthly 
instalments, was calculated partly, i.e. until 31 December 1994, on the basis of 
the reduced pension. The Committee upholds its views concerning commu-
nication No. 415/1990, that these reduced pension benefits for widowers are 
discriminatory on the ground of sex. Consequently, the reduced lump-sum 
payment received by the author is likewise in violation of article 26 of the 
Covenant, since the author was denied a full payment on equal footing with 
widows
Successful
HRC Hoofdman v 
The Netherlands 
CCPR/C/64/D/602/1994
Application of FE: By choosing not to enter into marriage, the author 
has not, in law, assumed the full extent of the duties and responsibilities 
incumbent on married persons. Consequently, the author does not receive 
the full benefits provided for by law to married persons. The Committee 
finds that this differentiation does not constitute discrimination within the 
meaning of article 26 of the Covenant.
Not successful 
HRC Vos v. The Netherlands 
Communication No. 
218/1986
Application of FE: The Committee is of the view that the unfavourable 
result complained of by Mrs. Vos follows from the application of a uniform 
rule to avoid overlapping in the allocation of social security benefits. This rule 
is based on objective and reasonable criteria, especially bearing in mind that 
both statutes under which Mrs. Vos qualified for benefits aim at ensuring to 
all persons falling thereunder subsistence level income. Thus the Committee 
cannot conclude that Mrs. Vos has been a victim of discrimination within the 
meaning of article 26 of the Covenant.
Not successful
HRC Zwaan-de Vries v. the 
Netherlands Communi-
cation No. 182/1984
Application of FE: Under section 13, subsection 1 (1), of the Unemployment 
Benefits Act (WWV) a married woman, in order to receive WWV benefits, 
had to prove that she was a ‘breadwinner’ - a condition that did not apply 
to married men. Thus a differentiation which appears on one level to be one 
of status is in fact one of sex, placing married women at a disadvantage 
compared with married men. Such a differentiation is not reasonable.
Successful
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Treaty 
Body
Decision Aspect of Substantive Equality Outcome
CEDAW Ms. A. T. v. Hungary (Com-
munication No. 2/2003)
Goeke v Austria (Com-
munication No. 5/2005) 
and 
Yildirim v Austria 
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005
(all three cases decided on 
the same reasoning)
While appreciating the State party’s efforts at instituting a comprehensive 
action programme against domestic violence and the legal and other 
measures envisioned, the Committee believes that these have yet to benefit 
the author and address her persistent situation of insecurity. The Committee 
further notes the State party’s general assessment that domestic violence 
cases as such do not enjoy high priority in court proceedings... Women’s hu-
man rights to life and to physical and mental integrity cannot be superseded 
by other rights, including the right to property and the right to privacy.
Successful 
CEDAW AS v Hungary The Committee finds a failure of the State party, through the hospital 
personnel, to provide appropriate information and advice on family planning, 
which constitutes a violation of the author’s right under article 10 (h) of the 
Convention. … The sterilization surgery was performed on the author without 
her full and informed consent and must be considered to have permanently 
deprived her of her natural reproductive capacity. Accordingly, the Committee 
finds the author’s rights under article 16, paragraph 1 (e) to have been 
violated.
(This woman was a Roma, but there was no discussion on this aspect of the 
case)
Successful
CEDAW Vertido v The Philippines 
CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008
The Committee stresses that stereotyping affects women’s right to a fair and 
just trial and that the judiciary must take caution not to create inflexible stan-
dards of what women or girls should be or what they should have done when 
confronted with a situation of rape based merely on preconceived notions of 
what defines a rape victim or a victim of gender-based violence, in general. 
...The Committee finds that one of them, in particular, according to which 
‘an accusation for rape can be made with facility’, reveals in itself a gender 
bias. With regard to the alleged gender-based myth and stereotypes spread 
throughout the judgement and classified by the author... the author in this 
situation not having followed what was expected from a rational and ‘ideal 
victim’ or what the judge considered to be the rational and ideal response of 
a woman in a rape situation.
Successful
CEDAW V.K. v Bulgaria 
CEDAW/C/49/D/20/2008
The exclusive focus of the Plovdiv courts on physical violence and on an 
immediate threat to the life or health of the victim reflects a stereotyped 
and overly narrow concept of what constitutes domestic violence...The Com-
mittee concludes that the refusal of the Plovdiv courts to issue a permanent 
protection order against the author’s husband was based on stereotyped, 
preconceived and thus discriminatory notions of what constitutes domestic 
violence.
Successful
CEDAW Abramova v Belarus 
CEDAW/C/49/D/23/2009
The Committee recalls that the fact that detention facilities do not address 
the specific needs of women constitutes discrimination, within the meaning 
of article 1 of the Convention.
Successful
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Treaty 
Body
Decision Aspect of Substantive Equality Outcome
CEDAW Teixeria v Brazil 
CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008
The lack of appropriate maternal health services in the State party that clear-
ly fails to meet the specific, distinctive health needs and interests of women 
not only constitutes a violation of article 12, paragraph 2, of the Convention, 
but also discrimination against women under article 12, paragraph 1, and 
article 2 of the Convention. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate maternal 
health services has a differential impact on the right to life of women.
In such circumstances, the Committee concludes that Ms. da Silva Pimentel 
Teixeira was discriminated against, not only on the basis of her sex, but also 
on the basis of her status as a woman of African descent and her socio-
economic background.
(However, there is no discussion on how her identity impacted the discrimi-
nation.)
Successful
CEDAW LC v Peru CEDAW/
C/50/D/22/2009
In view of the foregoing, the Committee considers that, owing to her 
condition as a pregnant woman, L.C. did not have access to an effective 
and accessible procedure allowing her to establish her entitlement to the 
medical services that her physical and mental condition required. Those 
services included both the spinal surgery and the therapeutic abortion... . The 
Committee also considers that the facts reveal a violation of article 5 of the 
Convention, as the decision to postpone the surgery due to the pregnancy 
was influenced by the stereotype that protection of the foetus should prevail 
over the health of the mother.
Successful
CEDAW RKB v Turkey 
CEDAW/C/51/D/28/2010
The Court examined the evidence adduced by the employer and scrutinized 
only the moral integrity of the author, a ‘female’ employee and not that of 
the male employees, namely Mr. M.A. and Mr. D.U.... The Committee is of 
the view that, in the present case, the court proceedings were based on the 
stereotyped perception of the gravity of extramarital affairs by women, that 
extramarital relationships were acceptable for men and not for women and 
that only women had the duty to ‘refrain from even the slightest offence 
against morality’.
Successful 
CEDAW Kell v Canada 
CEDAW/C/51/D/19/2008
As the author is an aboriginal woman who is in a vulnerable position, the 
State party is obliged to ensure the effective elimination of intersectional 
discrimination... The Committee further observes that, according to the State 
party’s submission, both the author’s income and the income of her partner 
were taken into account in determining their eligibility under the Northern 
Territorial Rental Purchase Program, yet when her name was removed from 
the Assignment of Lease, the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation did 
not take her contribution into consideration or inform her of the removal. 
These facts considered together indicate that the rights of the author under 
article16, paragraph 1 (h), of the Convention have been violated.
Successful 
CEDAW Jallow v Bulgaria 
CEDAW/C/52/D/32/2011
Considering that the author and her daughter were in a vulnerable position, 
in particular because the author is an illiterate migrant woman without a 
command of Bulgarian or relatives in the State party, and dependent on her 
husband, the Committee concludes that the State party failed to comply 
with its obligations established in article 2, paragraphs (b) and (c), read in 
conjunction with articles 1 and 3, of the Convention.
The Committee also observes that the authorities based their activities on 
a stereotyped notion that the husband was superior and that his opinions 
should be taken seriously, disregarding the fact that domestic violence 
proportionally affects women considerably more than men.
Successful 
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